Scientific Expertise in Policymaking: The Case for Open Review and Patent Reform by Noveck, Beth Simone
Scientific Expertise in Policymaking: 
The Case for Open Review and Patent Reform  
 
Beth Simone Noveck 
2Scientific Expertise in Policymaking: 
The Case for Open Review and Patent Reform 
Abstract 
The Energy Research Advisory Board, the group of external scientific advisors 
that provided impartial expert advice to the Secretary of Energy since 1978, was 
disbanded this May.  The Administration, like its predecessors, regularly 
replaces experts on agency advisory panels with ideologues and political allies.  
We are at the nadir of a historical progression since World War II away from 
trust in and use of scientific expertise in policymaking.  This shift however, has 
not been countered with greater public participation. Instead, administrative law 
and theory have developed a model of the managerial administrative authority. 
The "expertocratic" agency relies on internal expertise in order to develop policy 
in the public interest.  This is nowhere more the case than in the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office where the need for secrecy surrounding patent 
applications has entrenched a conception of the agency as expert.  While the first 
patent examiner, Thomas Jefferson, consulted Joseph Hutchinson, Professor of 
Chemistry on March 12, 1791 to seek his advice in connection with a patent on an 
alchemical process, modern patent examiners labor independently under a 
backlog of 1 million applications with no more than 18-20 hours to decide on the 
20 year grant of monopoly rights. The patentability determination, as much if not 
more so than any regulatory rulemaking by the EPA or FDA, depends upon 
knowledge of science. Yet examiners lack the requisite knowledge to examine 
patents adequately. Examiners are prohibited from consulting outside sources, 
often including the Internet.  Still over 90% of applications are granted.  This 
paper argues that the distrust of scientific expertise produces an information 
deficit that results in poor quality patents.  It views patent examination as a case 
study, illuminating a general problem with administrative policymaking, namely 
the lack of accountability to and input from scientific experts.  The Article puts 
forward a solution: “open review.”  Under this model, scientific experts provide 
input to the agency by means of an online network; that expertise is directly tied 
to ultimate legal decision-making. Unlike ordinary peer review, called for in the 
Information Quality Act, open review adopts a broader vision of collaborative 
expertise that cannot be manipulated. By being both more expert and more 
participatory, it avoids the problems described in the literature on science in 
policymaking. Unlike other proposals for ex post patent reform, open review 
addresses the core problem of information deficit that cannot be solved by the 
courts.  At this juncture when patent reform is uncertain to move either through 
Congress or the US Supreme Court, focusing our attention on the role of 
scientific expertise in agency practice may be our best opportunity, not only to 
bring about much-needed reform, but to do so in ways that are data-driven and 
empirically measurable.  The United States Patent and Trademark Office agrees 
with the assessment: it will implement a pilot of open review in 2007. 
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There is a crisis of patent quality.  Vague, overbroad patents lacking in 
novelty that fail the constitutional mandate of “promoting the progress of science 
and the useful arts”1 are being issued.  The grant of a high volume of patents 
(over 350,000 a year) at a staggering rate (upwards of 90% of patent applications 
are granted) produces increasing uncertainty about their merit.   Low quality 
patents risk litigation and confer the economic rewards of monopoly with little 
benefit to the public.2 In a recent empirical study, “Determinants of Patent 
Quality: An Empirical Analysis”3 Columbia Professor Bhaven Sampat analyzes 
 
* Assoc. Professor of Law and Director, Institute for Information Law and Policy, New York Law 
School.  Visiting Professor, Annenberg School, University of Pennsylvania.  McClatchy Visiting 
Assoc. Prof., Communications Dep’t., Stanford University.   Please note, all footnotes are long 
form to faciliate subsequent editing. 
1 U.S. Const. art. I, § 8. 
2 ADAM B. JAFFE AND JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS, 2 (2004) (“Thus, the 
patent system – intended to foster and protect innovation – is generating waste and 
uncertainty that hinders and threatens the innovative process.”).  See also A PATENT 
SYSTEM FOR THE 21ST CENTURY 70 (Stephen A. Merrill, Richard C. Levin, and Mark B. 
Myers, eds., 2004).  See also, Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In 
Search of Optimal Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 HOUS. L. REV. 1219, 1227-36 (2004); 
Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1496 
(2001); Editorial: The Problem with Patents, WALL ST. J., March 29, 2006, at 18.  
3 Bhaven Sampat, Determinants of Patent Quality: An Empirical Analysis (2006) 
(unpublished article manuscript available at 
http://siepr.stanford.edu/programs/SST_Seminars/patentquality_new.pdf_1.pdf). 
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the dataset of prior art references from 502,687 utility patents issued between 
January 1, 2001 and December 31, 2003.  He finds that “patent examiners have a 
comparative disadvantage in searching for non-patent prior art and foreign 
patents, suggesting that all else equal [sic], patents are likely to be of lower 
quality for technological areas for which most prior art is not embodied in U.S. 
patents.”4 Patent examiners are currently trying to make decisions about a 
twenty-year5 grant of monopoly rights that will shape an industry on the basis of 
information contained only in the USPTO’s internal databases.6 Examiners may 
not consult the public nor may they talk to experts or, in most cases, even use 
Google.   The information upon which examiners may rely in making a 
determination is further limited by poor or ambiguous drafting by applicants 
and the fact that there is no onus upon those applying for a patent to supply 
adequate information to the examiner.   The costs of searching fall to the Patent 
Office alone.7
As James Rumsey remarked in a letter to Thomas Jefferson in 1789, the 
issuance of patents is “more within the information of a board of academical 
 
4 Bhaven Sampat, Determinants of Patent Quality: An Empirical Analysis 3 (2006) 
(unpublished article manuscript available at 
http://siepr.stanford.edu/programs/SST_Seminars/patentquality_new.pdf_1.pdf).. 
5 Patent Act, 35 USC §154(a)(2) (2004) (“Subject to the payment of fees under this title, 
such grant shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and 
ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the 
United States…”). 
6 U.S.P.T.O., PARTS, FORM, AND CONTENT OF APPLICATION, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING 
PROCEDURES (MPEP) § 902.03(e)  (8th ed. 2004) (“The automated search tools on 
examiners' desktop computers include the Examiner's Automated Search Tool (EAST), 
the Web-Based Examiner Search Tool (WEST), and the Foreign Patent Access System 
(FPAS).”) 
7 Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173 (2006) (arguing that we must 
reduce the information costs of searching imposed upon the Patent Office). 
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professors, and a previous refusal of a patent would better guard our citizens 
against harassments by lawsuits.”8 Yet today’s patent system replaces expert 
“academical” input with the centralized and isolated expert-bureaucrat 
evaluating applications on the basis of a legal fiction, namely from the viewpoint 
of the “Person Having Ordinary Skill in the Art” (PHOSITA) in whose shoes he 
is expected to stand.9
The information deficit that plagues the Patent Office is a common 
problem faced by other government agencies as well. There is an 
institutionalized culture endemic to government that forecloses outside input10
and produces an information deficit.  There is a prevailing distrust of public 
participation and of scientific expertise, specifically. As Wendy Wagner writes, 
 
8 E.C. Walterscheid, Thomas Jefferson and the Patent Act of 1793, in 40 ESSAYS IN HISTORY 
(1998) (quoting Letter, James Rumsey to Thomas Jefferson, dated June 6, 1789, in THE 
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, Julian P. Boyd et al., Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1950 at 15:171-2).  
9 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2004).  See also Rebecca Eisenberg, Ideas Into Action: 
Implementing Reform of the Patent System: Obvious to Whom? Evaluating Inventions from the 
Perspective of PHOSITA, 19 BERK. TECH. L.J. 885, 886 (2004) (“[T]his language seems to call 
for evaluations of non-obviousness from the perspective of ordinary practitioners who 
are contemporaries of the inventor in the relevant technological community. It specifies a 
point in time as of which the obviousness of the invention should be evaluated (‘at the 
time the invention was made’) and designates the person whose judgment of 
obviousness should control (‘to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said 
subject matter pertains’ or PHOSITA), as well as directing attention to ‘the differences 
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art.’”) 
10 Beth Simone Noveck, Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 Emory L.J. 433, 450 
(2004) (“The APA's spare public consultation provisions have institutionalized the deep-
seated belief that the public, especially unorganized individuals or small interest groups, 
is an irritant - the pea to the agency's princess - unduly influencing and burdening the 
expert who alone possesses the knowledge and impartial sangfroid to govern in the 
public interest.”).  See also, Jim Rossi, Participation Run Amok: The Costs of Mass 
Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 173, 217 (1997) 
(critiquing value of public participation); See also CORNELIUS KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW 
GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 178—79 (2 ed. 1999) (describing 
patterns of participation and contending that, for a variety of reasons, participation in 
rulemaking is not particularly common or frequent.). 
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“attempts to incorporate science into environmental regulations have met with 
failure. Reduced public participation, excessive regulatory delays, and the 
incomplete and inaccurate incorporation of science have plagued science-based 
environmental regulation for nearly three decades.”11 The conviction in currency 
is that outside sources of scientific information compromise agency impartiality 
and democratic legitimacy.  Government agencies have come to rely increasingly 
on internal expertise to the exclusion of science; science understood in the broad 
meaning of a certain kind of knowledgeable expert adhering to the professional 
values dictated by the scientific method. The Patent Office, on which we focus, is 
but the paradigmatic example of the challenge of making complex decisions 
without the benefit of adequate information.  The solutions we propose, 
therefore, can apply to the reform of patents as well as to rememdy the 
information deficit at other agencies.  Hence the normative analysis should be of 
interest to intellectual property and administrative law scholars and practitioners 
alike. 
The United States Patent and Trademark Office is the epitome of a 
dysfunctional conception of expertise in our administrative culture. The earlier 
need for secrecy surrounding patent applications12 further entrenched the culture 
of agency-as-expert and the practice of rejecting scientific input. While the first 
 
11 Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613,  
1614 (1995). 
12 Prior to the enactment of the rules on publication in 1999, all applications were kept 
secret for the duration of prosecution.  Patent Act, 35 USC §122 (a) (2004)  (providing for 
confidentiality and secrecy of patent applications); Patent Act, 35 USC §122(b) (2004) 
(providing for publication at 18 months); see also U.S.P.T.O., PARTS, FORM, AND CONTENT 
OF APPLICATION, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES (MPEP) §1120  (8th ed. 
2004) (“Nonprovisional utility and plant applications: are published promptly after 
eighteen months from the earliest filing date for which application benefit is sought.”).   
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patent examiner, Thomas Jefferson, consulted Joseph Hutchinson, Professor of 
Chemistry at the University of Pennsylvania, on March 12, 1791 to seek his 
advice in connection with a patent on an alchemical process,13 this consultative 
and open vision of patent review subsequently gave way to our modern system 
of closed patent examination. 
Today 4,000 patent examiners14 labor independently under a backlog 
approaching 1 million applications15 with no more than 18-20 hours16 to review 
each one. The patentability determination, as much if not more so than any 
regulatory rulemaking by the EPA, depends upon knowledge of science. Yet 
examiners lack the requisite information to examine patents adequately: there is 
 
13 LEONARD WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 137 (1948) 
(quoting letter from Thomas Jefferson, dated 12 March 1791 reprinted in THE THOMAS 
JEFFERSON PAPERS 1606-1827 at the Library of Congress, available at 
http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/collections/jefferson_papers/index.html). 
14 There are currently 4,000+ patent examiners with plans to increase that number to 
7,200 in order to address the backlog. See U.S.P.T.O. Draft Strategic Plan 2007-2012, 71 
Fed. Reg. 50048 (2006) (In FY 2006, the USPTO plans to hire 1,200 patent professionals, 
and in years FY 2007 – FY 2012, we plan to hire at least 1,000 a year, for a total of at least 
7,200 patent examiner hires in 7 years.  This level of hiring is a critical component of the 
plans to address patent pendency regardless of the time frame for such improvements.  
Notwithstanding these massive hiring efforts, in the absence of other changes to the 
current examination system only modest gains in reducing patent pendency are likely to 
be achieved in the near term.  In fact, until these new hires are effectively absorbed into 
the examination system, average patent pendency will continue to increase.). 
15 At the end of 2005, the number of pending patent applications was 885,002 and rising.  
See U.S.P.T.O. Draft Strategic Plan 2007-2012, 71 Fed. Reg. 50048 (2006), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2007/index.htm.; U.S.P.T.O. 
Performance and Accountability Report Fiscal Year 2005: Other Accompanying 
Information: Table 3: Patent Applications Pending Prior To Allowance, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2005/060403_table3.html. 
16 Kevin Maney, Examiners Can’t Keep Up With Patent Applications, USA TODAY, June 15, 
2005, at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/columnist/kevinmaney/2005-09-20-patent-
office_xhtml (quoting John Doll, Commissioner for Patents, USPTO). U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, H.R. REP NO. GAO-05-720, THE USPTO HAS MADE PROGRESS IN 
HIRING EXAMINERS, BUT CHALLENGES TO RETENTION REMAIN (2005) (depending on the 
type of patent and the skill level of the examiner, each examiner is expected to process an 
average of 87 applications per year at a rate of 19 hours per application). See also, Brenda 
Sandburg, Speed Over Substance?, INTELL. PROP. MAGAZINE (March 1999). 
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either too little information about prior inventions on file – as in the case of 
computer software patents – or too much information – as in the case of 
biotechnology – without the means to sort it.  There is no continuing science 
education at the USPTO and no dialogue with the scientific community.  
This paper argues that abjuring input from and accountability17 to outside 
scientific expertise produces problems at the Patent Office and across agencies 
with information quality and information transparency.    The central insight is 
that distrust of science creates an information deficit that, in turn, produces poor 
quality patents and problematical agency rulemakings.  The reluctance to use 
science translates into undue reliance on centralized structures of expertise and 
decision making.  The distrust of outside expertise is magnified by the 
concomitant difficultly with engaging experts effectively and efficiently, 
compounding the informational deficit and turning the patent quality problem 
into a problem of information access.18
17 Temina Madon, Congress 101: Teaching Scientists The Language Of Policymakers, 6 BERK.
SCI. REV. 43, 44 (Spring 2006) (“Many scientists drawn into the world of policy share a 
sense that greater numbers of researchers should be involved in the decision-making 
process. Bruce Alberts, a biochemistry professor at UC San Francisco and former 
President of the National Academies, has been a strong advocate for the role of science in 
policy. During his tenure at the Academies he helped establish fellowship programs that 
bring scientists and engineers to Capitol Hill, with the goal of influencing lawmakers and 
convincing them to embrace evidence-based approaches in their work.”). 
18 For another perspective on the information problem of patents, see Lee Petherbridge, 
Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173 (2006) (focusing on the information costs associated 
with defining the boundaries of a patent and arguing that the failure on the part of the 
Patent Office to collect sufficient information from applicant is interfering with the ability 
to efficiently and reproducibly construct a consistent understanding of the boundaries of 
the patented property.  “So viewed, transactions involving questionable patents, and 
indeed transactions involving all patents, can be productively considered as problems of 
information costs and information cost allocation.” ).  See also see Clarisa Long, 
Information Costs in Patent and Copyright, 90 VA. L. REV. 465 (2004). 
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The dearth of information, as this Article argues, cannot be solved 
through judicial review.  Contrary to the prevailing theory ,“Daubert-izing”19
agency decision-making and changing the current standard of judicial review (or 
rather lowering the high degree of deference and lack of review) of agency 
decisions based on science is too slow, too intermittent and too late in the game 
to solve the problem.  Judicial review comes too late in the process to remedy the 
informational deficit, especially as judicial review has to await first a 2-5 year 
review process at the Patent Office itself.20 Judicial review cannot address the 
question of how policymakers should account for the uncertainty of scientific 
conclusions and still follow principles of sound science.  It does not address how 
to base decisions on quality information without sacrificing democratic 
legitimacy.  
Other reform proposals that call for ex post solutions, such as post-grant 
administrative review to “gold-plate” important patents, as Lemley, Lichtman 
and Sampat propose,21 still require improved mechanisms for getting at the 
information necessary to make the patentability determination.  Even proposals 
to change the statutory standards of patent examination and revisit the scope of 
patentable subject matter or the definition of obviousness do not obviate the need 
 
19 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). See Alan Charles Raul 
and Julie Zampa Dwyer, Science in the Regulatory Process, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 7 (2003). 
20 Joseph Farrell and Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: Why 
Litigation Won't Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review 
Might Help. 19 BERK. TECH. L. J., 1 (2004). 
21 Mark A. Lemley, Douglas Lichtman and Bhaven Sampat, What to Do about Bad Patents?,
28 REGULATION 10-13 (2005-6) (arguing for post-grant opposition, "a process by which 
parties other than the applicant would have the opportunity to request and fund a 
thorough examination of a recently issued patent."). 
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to address the grave problem of information deficit.  Even where there have been 
proposals to require applicants to perform more thorough searches, the applicant 
may lack the incentive and the knowledge to find all the relevant information. 
Instead, this Article puts forward a normative proposal for a new reform 
model22 that might revolutionize the process of patent examination.   It is a 
necessary precursor to all other patent reform proposals because it goes to this 
central question of the use of scientific information.  This proposal for what we 
shall term “open review” or “open examination” separates scientific from legal 
decision-making and distributes the former to an external expert community by 
means of an online network.  The scientific community provides informational 
input about what it knows best and, most important, those contributions are 
directly tied to the ultimate legal determination.  The patent examiner with her 
deep knowledge of the legal standards of patentability remains the ultimate 
arbiter.  Creating this network of scientific expertise, by means of new 
technology, would not eliminate the agency official nor would it shield the 
scientist from political decision-making.  This has the potential to remedy the 
information deficit and improve patent quality. 
The crux of this normative proposal is to go beyond more traditional peer 
review (e.g. as called for by the Information Quality Act23) or a science-centered 
NGO watchdog (e.g. ScienceWatch24) and invoke a broader and more transparent 
 
22 The proposal is outlined in detail at Beth Simone Noveck,“Peer to Patent”: Community 
Patent Proposal (April 2006), available at 
http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/proposals.html. 
23 Information Quality Act, Pub. L. No. 106-554, § 515(a) (2001). 
24 E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science’s Voice at the EPA, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 
53 (2003) (“Perhaps it is time for science qua science to get into the game by organizing a 
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vision of open and collaborative expertise.  We have both the tools and the 
know-how that enable us to organize open networks of expert participation in 
governmental decision making.  Open examination has the advantage of being 
both more expert and more participatory while avoiding the lack of 
transparency, that plagues traditional peer review.   With open examination, we 
can, first, improve patent quality by opening up review to the scientific 
community to remedy the information deficit, and, subsequently, apply the same 
approach to administrative decision making generally.  This proposal has far-
reaching implications for the ways we might use scientific expertise in 
policymaking. 
By redesigning the model for patent examination, this proposal points the 
way forward toward a new approach for administrative law, not by “Daubert-
izing” judicial review nor by reforming statutory standards25 but by improving 
agency institutional practice.   Introducing technology to bring about open 
review, instead of peer review, might enhance the institutional competence of the 
 
nongovernmental organization of independent environmental scientists whose only 
common interest is speaking up for the integrity of science in the process. For purposes 
of discussion, I will call this imaginary new entity "Science Watch."”). 
25 Current reform proposals include altering the definition of patentable subject matter, 
changing the definition of obviousness, abolishing the concept of constructive reduction 
to practice, narrowing the scope of willful infringement, changing the standards of 
judicial review and the presumption of patent validity and curtailing the availability of 
injunctions.  Matthew Sag and Kurt Rohde, A Differential Impact Analysis of Patent Reform,
Section B2 “Doctrinal Reform,” Aug 12, 2006, (unpublished manuscript available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers2/sag.doc) (discussing 
substantive statutory reform proposals). See also Jay Dratler, Invention is a Process, or Why 
the Electronics and Pharmaceutical Industries are at Loggerheads over Patents, Aug. 12, 2006, 
unpublished manuscript, available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers/Dratler.doc (calling for 
abolition of constructive reduction to practice and changing the non-obviousness 
standard). 
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Patent Office itself.  At this juncture when patent reform is uncertain to move 
either through Congress26 or the US Supreme Court,27 changing the 
administrative practices of the agency responsible for implementing patent law 
may be our best opportunity, not only to bring about reform, but also to do so in 
ways that are data-driven and empirically measurable.  
The United States Patent Office announced in its strategic plan (2007-
2012) that it will pilot this proposal (on the basis of an earlier draft of this Article) 
and institute its use for a controlled set of patents to be examined beginning in 
2007.28 Companies, including IBM, Microsoft, Oracle, Intel, Hewlett-Packard, 
and Red Hat have agreed to submit their patents for examination under this 
open system. 
Like the work of Arti Rai and Stuart Benjamin, this Article contends that 
drawing the comparison between patent examination and administrative 
practice, while giving rise to the complexities inherent in comparative work, is 
normatively desirable. Seeing patent examination as a case study of the way 
science is used in the administrative context shifts our focus to the institutional 
 
26 Recent proposed but as yet not enacted legislative proposals include: The Patent 
Reform Act of 2005, H.R. 2795, 109th Cong. (2005); The Patents Depend on Quality Act, 
H.R. 5096, 109th Cong. (2006); The Patent Litigation Pilot, H.R. 5418, 109th Cong. (2006).  
Patent lawyer, academic and blogger, Prof. Dennis Crouch writes: “Substantive patent 
reform legislation is dead for the year.”  Patently-O Weblog, 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2006/07/patent_reform_i.html (July 28, 2006). 
27 Metabolite Labs., Inc. v. Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings, 370 F.3d 1354, 2004 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 11248 (Fed. Cir., 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2976 (June 30, 2006) (dismissing writ 
of certiorari as improvidently granted). While the Supreme Court has heard other patent-
related cases this year,, the much-anticipated case reviewing the substantive scope of 
patentability was not heard. 
28 See U.S.P.T.O. Draft Strategic Plan 2007-2012, 71 Fed. Reg. 50048 (2006), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2007/index.htm (discussing patent 
application peer review pilot). 
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competence of the agency and highlights new opportunities for patent reform.29
Drawing the explicit connections between USPTO and general agency practices30
makes clear that at issue here is not only better quality patents, but more 
scientifically informed decisions and, thus, a stronger and more legitimate 
democracy. 
There is a substantial administrative policy literature on the role of 
scientific expertise31 and the mechanisms by which agencies procure (or not) 
information to inform decision making.  Because patents used to be confidential 
 
29 Stuart Minor Benjamin and Arti K Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA?  What the Patent System 
can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEORGETOWN L. J. ___ (2006).  Also available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=897307. See also, Kristen Osenga, 
Entrance Ramps, Tolls, and Express Lanes – Proposals for Decreasing Traffic Congestion 
in the Patent Office, 33 Fl. St. U. L. Rev. 119  (2005) (proposing mult-tiered patent 
application and examination system); Joseph Farrell and Robert P. Merges, Incentives to 
Challenge and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why 
Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERK. TECH. L. J. (2004) (arguing that judicial 
review cannot fix the patent problem alone and urging better USPTO funding and higher 
standards of initial review, better incentives (not limited to formal duties) for applicants 
to find and disclose prior art information, and the creation of a cheap and workable 
administrative post-issue review.). 
30 For another proposal that takes patent law in its administrative context, see Kali N. 
Murray, Rules for Radicals, (August 11, 2006 ) (unpublished manuscript, presented at IP 
Scholars Conference, Berkeley, California) (arguing that three key mechanisms—
expanded standing, citizen suits, and transparency—which allow environmental law to 
maintain a robust participation of diverse constituencies, are absent from patent law.), 
available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers/Murray.doc. 
31See Special Issue: AM. J. OF PUB. HEALTH, Scientific Evidence in Public Policymaking (Vol. 
95, S1, July 2005).  PHILIP KITCHNER, SCIENCE, TRUTH AND DEMOCRACY (2001); BRUCE L.R. 
SMITH, THE ADVISERS: SCIENTISTS IN THE POLICY PROCESS 1 (1992); SHEILA JASANOFF, THE 
FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICY MAKERS (1990); Dagmar Lohan, A Framework 
For Assessing the Input of Scientific Information Into Global Decisionmaking, 17 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1, 17625 (2006); Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: 
The Limits Of Science In Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255 (2004); Wendy 
Wagner, Science in the Regulatory Process: The "Bad Science" Fiction: Reclaiming The Debate 
Over The Role Of Science In Public Health And Environmental Regulation 66 L. & CONTEMP.
PROB. 63 (2003); Jerry Mashaw, Science In The Regulatory Process: Law And Engineering: In 
Search Of The Law-Science Problem, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 135 (2003); Daniel C. Esty, 
Toward Optimal Environmental Governance, 74 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 1495 (1999); Wendy Wagner, 
The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613(1995).   See also 
BRUNO LATOUR, THE POLITICS OF NATURE: HOW TO BRING THE SCIENCES INTO DEMOCRACY 
(2004); POLITICIZING SCIENCE: THE ALCHEMY OF POLICYMAKING (William Hough, ed. 2003). 
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and not published,32 little of this literature describes the intellectual property 
system per se.  Hence the goal of Part II is to set forth the arguments against the 
use of external scientific expertise. We want to understand the perceived 
problems with science as a tool for policymaking that have led to its disuse and 
the resulting information deficit.  Again, by science we are referring to relevant 
outside expertise and experience not experimental verification per se.  The 
perception of science as problematical has resulted in institutional processes that 
deprive agencies of information.  
In Part III, we demonstrate how the distrust of science is producing an 
information deficit that hampers patent examination.  It argues that the patent 
crisis – whether the problem of patent quality or simply the lack of efficiency in 
the process – is directly caused, not by faulty standards but by a lack of 
information in the examination process.    
In Part IV, we discuss why traditional peer review is not a solution to the 
informational deficit because it lacks transparency, has a closed vision of 
expertise and places undue burdens on scientists and agency officials alike.  As 
traditionally practiced, it also comes too late in the game to be useful to remedy 
the information deficit that impedes quality decision making. 
Part V of this paper lays out the proposal for open peer review and 
argues for opening up governmental processes, not to input from authenticated 
experts, but to the community that collectively is likely to have the knowledge 
 
32 In 1999, the Patent Law was amended to provide for publication of patent applications 
after eighteen months (with exceptions), Intellectual Property and Communications 
Omnibus Reform Act 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113 (1999).  The law amended these sections 
of the patent act concerning confidentiality and publication. 35 USC § 102(e), 35 USC § 
199(b), 35 USC § 122, 35 USC § 154 and 35 USC § 374 (2004). 
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and experience required to inform decision making.  This section explains how 
open review addresses the problems, not only with the use of science in 
policymaking but with peer review as it has traditionally been practiced.   Unlike 
other theoretical proposals for reform, the United States Patent and Trademark 
Office will pilot this “Peer to Patent” model in practice in 2007.  Open review 
combines the transparency and self-selection of public participation with the 
information criticality and expertise of peer review.  Metaphorically speaking, it 
marries the practices of Wikipedia to the authority of administrative law. 33
Finally, we conclude with a section on institutional competence, putting 
forth the claim that by applying technology to improve the patent examination 
process itself, we are, in fact, able to bring about law reform faster and more 
effectively than traditional strategies that regard Congress and the courts as the 
only institutional mechanisms for reform.  Where Congress has failed to pass 
reform legislation and the Supreme Court has declined to review the scope of 
patentable subject matter, Community Patent Review is being adopted in 
practice.  Patent examination is urgently in need of improvement to remedy the 
informational deficit that gives rise to low quality patents.  At the same time, the 
empirical lessons to be learned from reforming the institution of the United 
States Patent and Trademark Office promise to redound to the benefit, not only 
of intellectual property law and policy, but of administrative rulemaking more 
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broadly.  Open review offers the structure by which to tie public participation to 
governmental decision-making in ways that are manageable and useful, allowing 
us to reintroduce science into lawmaking while, at the same time, preserving its 
democratic legitimacy. 
 
Part II: The Use of Science in Policymaking: Arguments For and Against 
 
The Energy Research Advisory Board, the group of external scientific 
advisors that provided impartial expert advice to the Secretary of Energy since 
1978, was disbanded this May.   The current Administration regularly replaces 
experts on agency advisory panels with ideologues and political allies.  “The 
Bush administration for years has been stung by criticism that it has censored 
government scientists, manipulated research results, and conducted political 
"litmus tests" of prospective scientific advisory board members,” reports The 
Scientist Magazine.34 On February 18, 2004, 62 preeminent scientists including 
Nobel laureates, National Medal of Science recipients, former senior advisers to 
administrations of both parties, numerous members of the National Academy of 
Sciences, and other well-known researchers released a statement titled Restoring 
Scientific Integrity in Policy Making. In this statement, the scientists charged the 
Bush administration with widespread and unprecedented “manipulation of the 
 
34 Ted Agres, Panel Faults U.S. Science Policy National Science Board Finds Lack of Consistent 
Policy for Exchange of Government Research, THE SCIENTIST, June 6, 2006, available at 
http://www.the-scientist.com/news/display/23575/. 
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process through which science enters into its decisions.”35 This is not an entirely 
new practice.  The EPA Administrator under Reagan fired most of the scientists 
on its Science Advisory Board and replaced them with Republicans.36 Every year 
government agencies, especially the EPA, are accused of playing politics37 under 
the guise of science and depriving themselves of access to outside information. 
We are at the nadir of a historical progression since World War II away 
from trust in scientific expertise in policymaking. Or, more accurately, 
administrative agencies have brought scientific research in-house, relying on 
internal expertise and using the scientific profession largely to validate research 
after-the fact.   Because of a prevailing distrust of science and the belief that, to be 
democratically legitimate, agency decision making must be performed by the 
agency and not by outsiders, we are evolving increasingly ill-informed 
government institutions. “Although good science is crucial to sound, efficient, 
and effective regulations, agency decisions too often either disregard scientific 
evidence or reflect public policy considerations merely masked as science.”38 
This Section unpacks the arguments for and against the use of science in 
policymaking.  While not focused on patents, specifically, it is crucial to the 
 
35 Union of Concerned Scientists Report, Scientific Integrity in Policymaking: An 
Investigation into the Bush Administration Misuse of Science, March 2004, available at 
http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/scientific_integrity/RSI_final_fullreport_1.p
df 
36 E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science’s Voice at the EPA, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
45, 46 (2003). 
37 Union of Concerned Scientists Report, Surveys of Scientists at Federal Agencies (showing 
pervasive pattern of political interference) (last updated, March 2, 2006), available at 
http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/interference/fda-scientist-survey.html. 
38 Alan Charles Raul and Julie Zampa Dwyer, Science in the Regulatory Process, 66 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 9 (2003). 
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theory about information deficit and to the policy proposal  to understand the 
sources of the prevailing distrust of science and reluctance to use outside 
information.   
Proponents marshal numerous arguments in support of the use of 
scientific expertise in policymaking.  First and foremost among these contentions 
is that science remedies the democratic deficit of agencies by tempering 
discretion and tethering it to objective fact.  The scientific elite, unlike agency 
officials, is insulated from the political fray and less prone to be unduly 
influenced.  Reducing regulatory discretion is, at least in theory, a prime mover 
for including scientists in the policymaking processes.   Second, science informs 
policymaking with fact.  Fact-based policymaking ensures that we make rational 
decisions in the public interest to enhance public safety and well-being.   We 
want to know that the rules we make will work.  That requires basing them in 
some sort of predictive scientific fact.  Third, with the rise in the amount and 
scope of regulation over the years,39 it is, arguably, important that those rules be 
based on empirical reality that comes from the scientific method.   While 
legislation is a question of values, regulation, so the argument goes, must take 
those value-based decisions made by Congress and apply them to concrete facts.  
 
39 CLYDE WAYNE CREWS, JR., TEN THOUSAND COMMANDMENTS: AN ANNUAL SNAPSHOT OF
THE FEDERAL REGULATORY STATE 9 fig.6 (2003) (illustrating the number of Federal 
Register pages from 1993 to 2002). According to figures compiled from the National 
Archives and Records Administration, 4187 rules were proposed in 2002.   See also 
CORNEULIS KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES MAKE LAW AND WRITE 
POLICY (1994).  Kerwin cites the following: in 1981 there were 6,481 rules published, 
in1991, there were 4,413 rules published, in 2001 there were 19,643 rules published.  To 
understand the growth of rulemaking practice, however, it is illustrative to look at the 
number of pages of regulations in the Code of Federal Regulations. In 1938, the page 
count was, for example, 1, 174 for agriculture, 39 for labor and no environmental 
regulations (there was no EPA).  By 2001, that number was 10,406 for agriculture, 5,385 
for labor and 19,385 pages of environmental rulemaking activity. 
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The decision about the number of parts per billion of asbestos or lead in the air 
and water should not be made democratically but based on scientific know-how 
as to what is safe.  Science helps to translate the democratic mandate from the 
statute to create a clean environment into a set of considered practical standards 
and practices.  Since the role of agencies is to collect the data necessary to set 
those standards, rather than to pronounce general laws, science has an important 
role to play here. 40 
Paying lip service to the importance of good science and quality 
information, says little about the institutional mechanisms or structures by which 
science is integrated into governance.  There is a fourth rationale that proposes 
greater accountability to and decision making by the scientists because of their 
unique mindset.  Pro-science advocates suggest that scientific professionals 
should play a greater role in decision making processes.  Because of their 
adherence to the scientific method and its rigors, scientists stand in a special 
position, not only to withstand political influence, but to weigh complex 
questions of policymaking with impartiality. "I offer a conception of the scientist 
as artisan,” writes historian of science Arnold Pacey, “as a worker capable of 
offering to the broader community something of genuine value, whose 
contributions can be, and should be, responsive to a much wider range of 
concerns than are usually taken to be appropriate.”41 In Francis Bacon's New 
Atlantis, Bacon describes the island of Bensalem.  "Here mariners are treated with 
great hospitality, and they are surprised by the wisdom and generosity, and 
 
40 SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS 4 (1990). 
41 ARNOLD PACEY, TECHNOLOGY IN WORLD CIVILIZATION, 4 (1991). 
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incorruptibility of the island's government."  The leadership is founded upon the 
institution of an "elite group of investigators.”42 Whether intended as a parody or 
not, Bacon expresses the belief that as a profession, science because of the rigors 
of its method, is a foundation for good government.  This deference to expertise 
stands in contrast to the narrower view of Sheila Jasanoff.  She (and others) take 
the view that scientific expertise is particularly valuable, not in all circumstances, 
but when there is a problem to be solved with a well-defined scope, there is 
complex data required but not formulations of basic policy.43 These conceptions, 
despite their contrasts, view the scientific expert as standing in a special position 
to inform the processes of governance and provide the political official with 
policymaking options.44 Even where people disagree about the model of 
governance and whether competence ought to reside with federal, state or local 
officials, good scientific information can produce better decisions at every level. 
For every argument in favor, there are, however, at least two against.   
The role of science in policymaking is waning.  This is not to suggest that 
agencies do not use science, merely that it is considered a necessary but not 
sufficient ingredient of regulation. This, in turn, is leading to a reluctance to 
 
42 PHILIP KITCHNER, SCIENCE, TRUTH AND DEMOCRACY, 7 (2001). 
43 SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISERS AS POLICYMAKERS,10-11 (1990). 
44 Roger Pielke, Jr., When Scientists Politicize Science, REGULATION, Spring 2006, at 28 (A 
better alternative is for the scientific community to take some responsibility to address 
the policy significance of scientific results. This would mean not simply seeking to better 
“communicate” the results of science to the policymaker, but developing the capability to 
place science into policy context,  i.e., to address the question of what policy alternatives 
are consistent with and inconsistent with scientific results. If the scientific community 
wishes to claim independence from partisan politics, then with this comes an obligation 
to provide independent guidance on the significance of science for a wide scope of policy 
alternatives. Instead of the futile effort to keep science and politics separate, it may make 
more sense to ask scientists to engage more substantively in policy debate, not by taking 
sides but instead by serving as “honest brokers of policy options.”). 
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consult outside experts and an information deficit.  Legislative considerations, 
not science, are meant to determine the regulatory agenda. Former EPA General 
Counsel E. Donald Elliott has documented the "decline of science as an important 
determinant in environmental decision making."45 We are replacing scientific 
experts with political appointees.46 Even with the additional Federal Advisory 
Committees47 and Science Boards48 and peer review mandates,49 the emerging 
trend over the last fifty years is away from reliance on extra-agency input.  This 
is perhaps the reason it was necessary to enact an executive order to mandate its 
 
45 E. Donald Elliott et al., Science, Agencies, and the Courts: Is Three a Crowd?, 31 ENVTL. L. 
REP. 10,125, 10,126 (2001). 
46 Alan Charles Raul and Julie Zampa Dwyer, Science in the Regulatory Process, 66 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 11 (2003) (“Through detailed reports and analyses, the General 
Accounting Office ("GAO") has consistently documented EPA's faulty scientific methods 
as well as its practice of obscuring the policy-based reasons for some of its decisions. 
GAO recently noted concern among observers ‘about whether [EPA and other] agencies' 
procedures and assumptions are sufficiently transparent, thereby providing decision-
makers and the public with adequate information about the scientific and policy bases 
for agencies' risk estimates as well as the limitations and uncertainties associated with 
those estimates.’  GAO has also cited gaps and inaccuracies in EPA data that further 
compromise the agency's ability to assess risks and set risk-based priorities. These gaps, 
in part, explain EPA's heavy reliance on assumptions.”) 
47 Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA), Pub. L. 92-463, 5 U.S.C., App 2 6(c) (1972).  
There are over 800 Federal Advisory Committees today.   The Federal Advisory 
Committee Database is available at http://fido.gov/facadatabase/. See also, The 
Twenty-Seventh Annual Report to the President on Federal Advisory Committees, U.S. 
General Services Administration, available at 
http://fido.gov/facadatabase/printedannualreports%5C1998-
TwentySeventh%20Annual%20Report%20Of%20The%20President%20On%20Federal%2
0Advisory%20Committees.pdf. Additional documents on peer review available on the 
Office of Management and Budget website on Information Policy, E-Gov and IT, at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/inforeg/infopoltech.html. 
48 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, EPA’S SCIENCE ADVISORY BOARD PANELS: IMPROVED 
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES NEEDED TO ENSURE INDEPENDENCE AND BALANCE, GAO-01-536 
(2001); Robert F. Blomquist, Integrated Pollution Control: A Symposium: & Article: The Epa 
Science Advisory Board's Report On "Reducing Risk": Some Overarching Observations 
Regarding The Public Interest, 22 ENVTL. L. REP. 149 (1992). 
49 See Off. of Mgmt. and Budget, JOSHUA B. BOLTEN, ISSUANCE OF OMB’S FINAL 
INFORMATION QUALITY BULLETIN FOR PEER REVIEW, OMB Memorandum M-05-03 (Dec. 16, 
2004). 
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consideration. Executive Order 12,866 enacted in 1993 declared that “each agency 
shall base its decisions on the best reasonably obtainable scientific, technical, 
economic, and other information concerning the need for, and consequences of, 
the intended regulation.”50
What are the arguments, therefore, against relying on too much scientific 
expertise or creating mechanisms for greater accountability to the scientific 
profession?  How did we get to this point of entrenched distrust of scientific 
expertise? 
While proponents laud the use of expertise as a remedy to democratic 
deficiencies, critics point out that scientific expertise is both undemocratic and 
unaccountable.  Science, like managerial expertise, cannot and should not 
substitute for democratic decision-making.  It can inform policymaking with fact 
but the “reality is,” writes environmental activist and administrative law scholar 
David Schoenbrod, “that science is surprisingly uncertain.”51 Rarely does 
consensus exist around regulatory issues such as environmental hazards.  
 
50 Regulatory Planning and Review, Exec. Order No. 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Oct. 4, 
1993). 
51 As Harvard administrative law scholar, Gerald Frug notes, this was the era of the 
“expertise model” of governance that legitimated bureaucracy in a democracy by 
reference to its positivist groundings. Gerald Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American 
Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1283-84 (1984) (“Progressives and certain New Dealers--
including organization theorists like Philip Selznick, corporate managerialists like 
Chester Barnard, Elton Mayo, Peter Drucker, and Douglas McGregor, and  
administrative law scholars like Woodrow Wilson and James Landis -- agreed with the 
charge that bureaucracies were not in fact controlled by commands issued from outside. 
They recognized the enormous range of discretion exercised by bureaucratic managers; 
indeed, they argued that this discretion was not only an unavoidable ingredient of 
bureaucratic life but also its very raison d'etre. Instead of fearing bureaucratic discretion, 
these thinkers welcomed it because they perceived the managers and employees who 
exercised it to be 'experts' whose professionalism simultaneously limited the scope of 
their power, prevented personal domination, and made possible the creativity and 
flexibility necessary to the effectiveness of the bureaucratic form.”) 
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Instead, regulators and politicians invoke science as a justification for politics.   
Bureaucrats use science to avoid accountability for politics; scientists, it is 
complained, are often lobbyists in disguise. “Studies of scientific advising leave 
in tatters the notion that it is possible, in practice, to restrict the advisory process 
to technical issues or that the subjective values of scientists are irrelevant to 
decision making.”52 Agencies practice politics and manipulate science to suit 
ideological ends.  Wendy Wagner famously writes of the “science charade”53 and 
Schoenbrod talks of “co-opting the legitimacy of science.”54 He goes on to give 
numerous examples to illustrate what he views as the fallacy of scientific 
impartiality; or, more accurately, the way agency politics are invoked to 
manipulate and distort legitimate scientific research, leading to decisions based 
on bad information.  "[T]he EPA hired the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 
to study whether lead pollution is harmful.  The NAS is the citadel of science in 
Washington, but science in Washington is sometimes politics by other means.  
The NAS appointed a panel slanted in favor of the lead-additive makers and 
their allies in the petroleum and lead industries.  According to Science magazine, 
the panel included four industry employees, but 'no identifiable 
'environmentalist'...as a counterpoise to industry's weight.'”55 Schoenbrod, like 
others, points out that we have not been able to come to terms about appropriate 
 
52 SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICY MAKERS, 230 (1990). 
53 Wendy Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1613, 
34453 (1995); Wendy Wagner, Science In The Regulatory Process: The "Bad Science" Fiction: 
Reclaiming The Debate Over The Role Of Science In Public Health And Environmental 
Regulation, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROB. 63 (2003); 
54 DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON 221 (2005). 
55 DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON 30 (2005). 
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levels of lead for children, for example.  We cannot reliably conclude that certain 
toxins released into our water are, in fact, dangerous. 
Where there is no scientific consensus, we cannot legitimately base 
decisions on science and must avoid biased and prejudicial information.  But it is 
not just a question of scientific certainty.56 Even if science were to be a reliable 
determinant, there is another critique – a variation on the theme about 
democratic legitimacy – that argues against making decisions on the basis of 
science rather than on the basis of values. Even where we can identify health and 
safety risks with some precision, the democratic mandate demands that decision-
making in the public interest must be driven by other factors as well.  We have to 
consider “facts on the ground”57 and how they are impacted, what their concerns 
are and what solutions they might propose.   Schoenbrod tells the story of the 
small-scale cider farmers in upstate New York and New England and how they 
devised a better and less expensive plan to protect the public than the stringent 
rules on pasteurization called for by the FDA.  Science, which might dictate safe 
levels of bacteria, does not solve the problem of how to get to those safe levels. 
Only localized decision making with the benefit of that knowledge and 
experience, suggests Schoenbrod, can solve the problem.    
 
56 Matthew Sag and Kurt Rodhe, A Differential Impact Analysis of Patent Reform 6 (draft 
dated Aug 12, 2006), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers2/sag.doc (quoting STEPHEN 
TOULMIN, RETURN TO REASON 204-214 (2001)). “[A] demand for ‘conclusive proof’ of a 
proposition may itself simply reflect a preoccupation with a narrow mathematical form 
of reasoning modeled on the scientific method, and a futile quest for certainty where 
certainty is not possible.”). 
57 DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON 13 (2005). 
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It would be simplistic to suggest that agencies are not relying on science.   
They cannot do their work without it. But the belief and trust in science, the 
willingness to permit scientific input and review before a decision is made, are 
on the decline. Over time, we have shifted toward a vision of agencies as 
managing social interests and weighing values rather than one of agencies 
managing expertise58 This acknowledges the political pressures of governance 
even within the agency. While agencies have always had to balance interests and
rely on expert, scientific information, the prevailing legal realist view is that 
agencies are subject to political pressure and should avoid the use of outside 
expertise. 
While in 1972, there were 1400 Federal Advisory Committees by 1982, 
there were 878.  By 1992 the number increased to 1141 but only 33% of those 
were established on the basis of agency authority (as opposed to legislative 
mandate) and in 1998 the number once again dropped to 892 with 28% chartered 
under agency authority.59 Of course, these numbers alone do not convey the 
entire picture of who served on these committees, whether they were from 
academic or industry science and what account, if any, was taken of their work.  
Federal Advisory Committees are, in any case, coming under fire for beign 
 
58 See Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE L.J. 359, 
360 (1972)  ("The 'public interest' . . . is not a monolith," writes Gellhorn. "It involves a 
balance of many interests and the presentation of otherwise unrepresented views should 
be viewed as a potential aid rather than a hindrance to agency operations."). 
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essentially ideological rather than scientific mouthpieces.60 But the declining 
numbers and the Executive Order61 in 1993 to cut Federal Advisory Committees 
for being wasteful and ineffectual, give some indication.  Agencies are taking 
scientific research in-house and, whether for improper reasons of political 
ideology or for appropriate reasons of avoiding political manipulation, they take 
less account of science and have become less transparent about the information 
used in their decision making. 
This shift away from science is accelerated by the fact that courts are not 
required and, in fact, will not review agency decisions based on a supposed lack 
of adequate scientific information.62 As the Supreme Court held in Vermont 
Yankee, an agency may only be reviewed for failing to follow a statutory mandate 
not based on the quality of the information as such. 63 While there have been 
cases criticizing an agency’s use of science,64 on the whole, courts defer to agency 
determinations about science.65 “[M]any panels defer excessively to any agency 
 
60 See Defending Science, Federal Advisory Committees at 
http://www.defendingscience.org/public_health_regulations/Federal-Advisory-
Committees.cfm (last visited Aug. 29, 2006).  
61 Termination and Limitation of Federal Advisory Committees, Exec. Order 12838, 58 
Fed. Reg. 8207 (Feb 10, 1993), available at 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=61534. 
62 see Stephen Merrill, Forward, 66 L. & Contemp Problems 2 (2003). 
63 Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corporation v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
435 U.S. 519; 98 S.Ct. 1197; 55 L. Ed. 2d 460 (1978). 
64 Alan Charles Raul and Julie Zampa Dwyer, Science in the Regulatory Process, 66 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 19 (2003). 
65 See, e.g. Sigma-Tau Pharma v. Schwetz, 288 F.3d 141, 146 (4th Cir. 2002) (the “broad 
deference” due the agency “is all the more warranted when, as here, the regulation 
concerns 'a complex and highly technical regulatory program,' in which the identification 
and classification of relevant 'criteria necessarily require significant expertise and entail 
the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns.'”) Thomas Jefferson Univ., 512 
U.S. at 512 (quoting Pauley v. Beth Energy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 697, 115 L. Ed. 2d 
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action that contains a scientific component. In some instances courts effectively 
avoid judicial review entirely, preferring instead to defer blindly to an agency's 
decision regardless of its sometimes even obvious flaws. Such judicial passivity 
does not enhance democratic accountability.  Chevron66 and Daubert67 teach that 
courts need not -- and must not -- venture into the merits of competing or 
complex scientific findings.”68 Judicial deference to decisions based on science 
only produce a greater incentive for agencies to legitimize their decisions on the 
basis of what is often junk science69 but gives the appearance of credibility. 
While science is losing the battle, because the result is declining quality of 
decision making, it is the public that ultimately loses the war. 
 
Information Deficit and Patent Quality 
604, 111 S. Ct. 2524 (1991)); see also Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 865 (1984) (sometimes the legislative delegation to an 
agency on a particular question is implicit rather than explicit. In such a case, a court may 
not substitute its own construction of a statutory provision for a reasonable interpretation 
made by the administrator of an agency. … “in these cases the Administrator's 
interpretation represents a reasonable accommodation of manifestly competing interests 
and is entitled to deference: the regulatory scheme is technical and complex, the agency 
considered the matter in a detailed and reasoned fashion, and the decision involves 
reconciling conflicting policies.  Congress intended to accommodate both interests, but 
did not do so itself on the level of specificity presented by these cases. Perhaps that body 
consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance at this level, thinking that 
those with great expertise and charged with responsibility for administering the 
provision would be in a better position to do so; perhaps it simply did not consider the 
question at this level; and perhaps Congress was unable to forge a coalition on either side 
of the question, and those on each side decided to take their chances with the scheme 
devised by the agency. For judicial purposes, it matters not which of these things 
occurred.) 
66 Chevron U. S. A. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
67 Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993). 
68 Alan Charles Raul and Julie Zampa Dwyer, Science in the Regulatory Process, 66 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 28 (2003). 
69 PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 1-6 (1991). 
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There was enough of a sense that agencies are making decisions without 
the benefit of the best or the right scientific information that Congress felt 
compelled to pass the Information Quality Act in 2001 (IQA).70 Its goal (in 
theory if not in practice) is to improve government policymaking by changing 
the information upon which the government can rely to make decisions.  It is 
intended to improve quality and, at the same time, increase public participation 
and improve information disclosure by agencies.  Regardless of whether the law 
has any salutary effect (and administrative law scholar Steven Johnson 
vehemently argues that it does not), there is a prevailing information deficit 
resulting from the war on science.  Nowhere is that more the case and nowhere 
are the effects more obvious than in the case of patents and patent examination 
practice. 
A consensus is emerging that there is a crisis of “patent quality.”  Because 
of a lack of access to adequate information and to the knowledge of how to apply 
it most effectively, the USPTO is granting undeserving applications.  Bureaucrats 
are supposed to possess “the knowledge that comes from specialized 
experience.”71 Yet the reality is that the supposedly expert bureaucrat – in this 
case fifty-five percent of patent examiners – has been at the USPTO for fewer 
 
70 Information Quality Act, 35 USC § 3516; Pub. L. No. 106-554, para 515, 114 Stat. 2763A-
153-154 (Dec. 21, 2000).  Implemented by the Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Information 
Quality Guidelines, 67 Fed. Reg. 369 (Jan. 3, 2002), reissued with corrections, 67 Fed. Reg. 
8452 (Feb. 22, 2002). 
71 Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 
1669. 1678 (1975). 
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than two years.72 It is not surprising given the fact that they are getting paid 
approximately $55,000 and a first-year associate in a Manhattan law firm earns a 
base salary of $125,000. In addition to being underpaid, they are also 
overworked.73 An examiner has an average of 18-20 hours to do the initial review 
of an application.74 Arguably, we have returned to the registration regime we 
abandoned in 1836.75
Patent bureaucrats enjoy a great deal more discretion than their 
counterparts at other agencies.  They have responsibility for granting a twenty-
year monopoly with limited supervision, oversight or review when a first or 
second year civil servant at another agency would be drafting memos. The wide-
ranging discretion of agency officials would not be such a problem, Adam Jaffe 
and Josh Lerner point out in Innovation and Its Discontents, were it not for the fact 
that courts are increasingly likely to find in favor of patent holders.76 The 
 
72 ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 136 (2004). 
73 Gregory Aharonian, A Few Patent Examiners Complain About Patent Quality, PATNEWS, 
(January 28, 1999). 
74 H.R. REP NO. GAO-05-720 (June 15, 2005). The USPTO Has Made Progress in Hiring 
Examiners, but Challenges to Retention Remain (depending on the type of patent and the 
skill level of the examiner, each examiner is expected to process an average of 87 
applications per year at a rate of 19 hours per application. United States Government 
Accountability Office Intellectual Property The USPTO Has Made Progress in Hiring 
Examiners, but Challenges to Retention Remain). See also, Brenda Sandburg, Speed Over 
Substance?, INTELL. PROP. MAGAZINE (March 1999). 
75 J. Giles and S. Rich, Laying the Ghost of the “Invention” Requirement 14 FED. CIR. B.J.163, 
165 (2005) (We had an examination regime from 1790 to 1793 and then adopted a 
registration system from 1793 to 1836 but the outcry was so great that we had to return to 
examination and created the modern Patent Office to handle the work.). 
76 James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, Lessons For Patent Policy From Empirical Research On 
Patent Litigation, 9 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1, 22 (2005) (“There is also direct evidence that 
the Federal Circuit has changed patent validity and patent scope. The research must be 
used cautiously though, because it does not control for the selection effect. Allison and 
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Supreme Court rarely hears patent-related certiorari petitions77 (2006 being a 
notable exception).78
Patents are consequently both stronger, easier to get and more likely to be 
upheld without any concomitant guarantee of their quality.  This has led to a 
system that sometimes rewards invention at the expense of innovation.   In other 
words, the inventor may receive the boon of the patent monopoly but the “useful 
arts,” that the Constitution aims to advance are not promoted. Instead, the 
current system has generated tremendous uncertainty with regard to the role 
patents play in the marketplace.  Whether the cause or the effect, there are 
 
Lemley find the patent validity rate has increased since the creation of the Federal 
Circuit. Lunney finds that the Federal Circuit is less likely to find infringement than 
predecessor courts and thus has narrowed patent scope. Wagner and Petherbridge find 
Federal Circuit claim interpretation decisions are growing more predictable.”); see also 
Jay P. Kesan and Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases Resolved? An Empirical 
Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of Patent Disputes, U Ill. L. & Econ. Research 
Paper (2005) (“[S]ignificant percentage of cases (about 8-9%) are resolved on the merits 
through summary judgment. Consequently, summary judgments are important in patent 
cases for determining patent validity and infringement, and the summary judgments 
related to patent validity occur earlier in the litigation compared to summary judgments 
related to patent infringement. This result is somewhat encouraging given the important 
role played by the courts in revoking patent rights improvidently granted at the outset 
by the PTO. Nevertheless, despite the fact that such rulings occur early in the 
proceedings compared to patent trials, we should still be concerned about the huge 
transaction costs associated with patent litigation because summary judgments in 
general, and summary judgment based on invalidity in particular, are expensive 
compared to summary judgments granted on other grounds.”), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=808347. 
77 Mark D. Janis, Intellectual Property Challenges in the Next Century: Patent Law in the Age of 
the Invisible Supreme Court, 2001 U. Ill. L. Rev. 387, 387 (2001) (The Supreme Court has 
rendered itself well nigh invisible in modern substantive patent law. The Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, created in 1982, has become the de facto supreme court 
of patents.). 
78 See generally eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC., 126 S. Ct. 1565 (2006); Illinois Tool 
Works, Inc., v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1281 (2006); LabCorp v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 
126 S. Ct. 2921, 165 L. Ed. 2d 399 (2006)(dismissing writ of cert.); MedImmune, Inc. v. 
Genentech, Inc., 126 S. Ct. 1329 (2006); KSR Intn’t v. Teleflex, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006). 
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double the number of patent applications today and the backlog has risen to over 
1 million. 
In practice, the examiner has too little information or too little knowledge 
of how to apply available information in order to render a decision.  The 
examiner searches an internal Patent Office database containing U.S. and foreign 
patent applications and certain journals in an effort to find prior art.  While some 
examiners might use Google to look up information online, the use of Internet 
research is severely restricted for security reasons.  In more than half the 
technology centers79 (formerly known as examining groups) at the USPTO, 
Internet research is forbidden.80 He is limited to those sources he can find on his 
own from the office. 
This gives rise to a “goldilocks” problem: too little information, too much 
information and none of it just right.81 In searching for prior art, know-how that 
 
79 For a list of the USPTO Technology Centers, see 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/info/pat-tech.htm. 
80 U.S.P.T.O., PARTS, FORM, AND CONTENT OF APPLICATION, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURES (MPEP) 904.02(c)  (8th ed. 2004) (“When the Internet is used to 
search, browse, or retrieve information relating to a patent application which has not 
been published, other than a reissue application or reexamination proceeding, Patent 
Organization users MUST restrict search queries to the general state of the art unless the 
Office has established a secure link over the Internet with a specific vendor to maintain 
the confidentiality of the unpublished patent application. Non-secure Internet search, 
browse, or retrieval activities that could disclose proprietary information directed to a 
specific application which has not been published, other than a reissue application or 
reexamination proceeding, are NOT permitted. This policy also applies to use of the 
Internet as a communications medium for connecting to commercial database 
providers.”).  See also Internet Usage Policy, 64 F.R. 33056, Art. 4 (June 21, 1999) (“If 
security and confidentiality cannot be attained for a specific use, transaction, or activity, 
then that specific use, transaction, or activity shall NOT be undertaken/conducted.”) 
81 See also, Jay Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERK. TECH. L.J. 
763, 763 and 767 (2002) (“It is widely recognized that the Patent Office grants overly-
broad  patents because it has deficient knowledge of the relevant prior art, especially in 
high technology areas with significant nonpatent prior art.”). 
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predates the invention that might pre-empt it and invalidate the patent’s claims, 
such as patents or journal articles, websites or other disclosures that might 
suggest that the invention is not new, the examiner sometimes turns up nothing.  
While the patent may sound like something familiar that’s come before, often she 
cannot find other written material that actually teaches the claims of the patent.  
Alternatively, she is so inundated with related prior art but has trouble in the 
time allotted to review an application, winnow the material and find art that is 
relevant and useful for the examination process.82 Even if she can find art that is 
pertinent, she still may have trouble knowing from the perspective of one 
practicing in that area if the patent is an obvious or non-obvious inventive leap 
over the combined prior art references.  
A patent examiner, especially those who may not use the Internet, must 
find their information from two computers systems in place at the United States 
Patent Office: `EAST' (Examiner's Automated Search Tool) and `WEST' (Web-
Based Examiner Search Tool).  In addition, there is a database of foreign patent 
filing.  These databases provide access to prior U.S. patents, foreign patent 
abstracts, certain pending U.S. applications, and additional proprietary database 
libraries.   Examiners can conduct full-text searching of published applications 
since 2001 and patents granted since 1970 as well as access optically-scanned 
copies of patents since 1920.83 Patent applications, of course, also contain 
 
82 Eli Kintisch, US Patent Policy: USPTO Wants to Tap Experts to Help Examiners, SCIENCE,
19 May 2006 at 982, available at 
http://www.sciencemag.org/cgi/content/full/312/5776/982b. 
83 U.S.P.T.O., PARTS, FORM, AND CONTENT OF APPLICATION, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURES (MPEP) 902.03(e)  (8th ed. 2004) (“The automated search tools on 
examiners' desktop computers include the Examiner's Automated Search Tool (EAST), 
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references to prior art.  Contrary to popular assumption, they do not contain 
access to the corpus of scientific knowledge.84
In Sampat’s recent study85 of 502,687 utility patents, he finds that 
examiners have a comparative disadvantage in searching for non-patent prior art 
or foreign patents.86 Interestingly, while patent examiners account for 41% of the 
citations to previous U.S. patents, they account for only 10% of references to non-
patent prior art. “If an applicant does not search for prior art and thereby does 
not report a piece of relevant prior art on his/her information disclosure 
statement, the examiner is less likely to discover it if it is codified in the non-
patent literature or a foreign patent than if it is codified in a U.S. patent, since 
examiner capabilities for searching for U.S. patents exceed their capabilities for 
searching other sources of prior art.”87
Particularly in cutting-edge areas of innovation where information may 
not be available in patent applications, examiners are not digging up what they 
need.  Applicants are not required to provide it.88 “Because the applicant need 
 
the Web-Based Examiner Search Tool (WEST), and the Foreign Patent Access System 
(FPAS).”).  
84 Paul Edward Geller, An International Patent Utopia?, 25 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 515, 516 
(2003) (calling for the creation of open, global databases and the linking of local patent 
databases into a globally distributed database to facilitate global searching). 
85Bhaven Sampat, Determinants of Patent Quality: An Empirical Analysis (2006), available at 
http://siepr.stanford.edu/programs/SST_Seminars/patentquality_new.pdf_1.pdf. 
86 Bhaven Sampat, Determinants of Patent Quality: An Empirical Analysis 3 (2006), available 
at http://siepr.stanford.edu/programs/SST_Seminars/patentquality_new.pdf_1.pdf. 
87 Bhaven Sampat, Determinants of Patent Quality: An Empirical Analysis 13 (2006), 
available at 
http://siepr.stanford.edu/programs/SST_Seminars/patentquality_new.pdf_1.pdf. 
88 The applicant is required to disclose any information which is material to the 
prosecution of the patent.  Oath or Declaration, 37 CFR 1.63(b)(3) (2004). According to 
Chisum, “Traditionally, standard practice in the Patent and Trademark Office did not 
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only provide material information of which he or she is aware, and is not 
required to search for any of this information, the informational burdens on the 
examiner are clearly heavy—even before the examiner engages in the heavy 
lifting of interpreting the prior art.”89 Third-party comment, while provided for 
in the statute,90 must be made within a two-month window for a fee and without 
commentary and is, therefore, rarely invoked. 
Under current law, patent examiners may consult databases but they may 
not consult the public when searching for prior art.91 The examiner is expected to 
be scientifically adept enough to discover the prior art on her own. However, 
 
require the applicant to disclose or cite items in the prior art believed to be relevant to the 
patentability of claims in the application. The examiner searched the prior art and cited 
relevant items in reasons given for rejection of claims. Furthermore, an applicant and his 
or her patent attorney were under no duty to conduct a search of the prior art.”  Chisum 
on Patents, 6-19 Chisum on Patents § 19.03 (b) (2006).  Sometimes applicants file no prior 
art at all.  See, e.g. Tim Palmer, Applicants not Citing Any Prior Art: Scary, Patent 
Chronicles (March 23, 2005, 3:30 pm), available at 
http://www.patentchronicles.com/archives/20050323/applicants-not-citing-any-
artscary/ (The USPTO has proposed a rule change to “encourage patent applicants to 
provide the USPTO the most relevant information related to their inventions in the early 
stages of the review process. As a result, patent applications could be processed in a 
more streamlined and effective manner.”). Changes To Information Disclosure Statement 
Requirements and Other Related Matters, 71 Fed. Reg. 38808 (10 July 2006). 
89 Lee Petherbridge, Positive Examination, 46 IDEA 173, 183 (2006). 
90 Patent Act, 35 U.S.C. § 122(c) (2004). That has been interpreted to mean that only prior 
art without commentary can be submitted.  Hence the Manual of Patent Examining 
Procedure Rule 1134.01 implementing the Code of Federal Regulations, 37 CFR 1.99, 
provides that third parties may submit prior art without commentary in response to a 
published but not-yet-granted application.  Within two months of publication, someone 
may submit no more than 10 patents and publications.  They may not highlight or mark 
up the materials submitted.  They must pay $180 for the privilege of submitting prior art.  
The patent examiner may not respond to the third party (except to process the fee). 
91 U.S.P.T.O., PARTS, FORM, AND CONTENT OF APPLICATION, MANUAL OF PATENT 
EXAMINING PROCEDURES (MPEP) § 1.291(d) (8th ed. 2004) Protests by the Public against 
Pending Applications. A member of the public filing a protest in an application under 
this section will not receive any communication from the Office relating to the protest, 
other than the return of a self-addressed postcard which the member of the public may 
include with the protest in order to receive an acknowledgement by the Office that the 
protest has been received. 
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third parties may, to a limited extent, submit prior art after the publication and 
before the issuance of a patent.  While patent examination is confidential, non-
provisional utility applications are published eighteen months after the filing 
date.92
While the patent examination process is unique, it mimics in many 
important respects the way agencies make decisions, including ones such as 
these that have a longstanding impact on the economy and on scientific 
innovation.  The examiner is forced to enact a 20-year grant of monopoly rights 
on the basis of an internal database and without the benefit of outside 
information.  Whether it’s horror stories about the EPA and the Clean Air Act or 
the Patent Office and the Peanut Butter and Jelly Sandwich Patent,93 the 
pervasive information deficit problem that has resulted from an absence of 
adequate scientific expertise in policymaking is causing problems. 
Part III: Why Traditional Peer Review is Not the Solution 
 
The traditional solution proposed to remedy the information deficit and 
information quality problem in administrative agencies is peer review.  Peer 
review provides a mechanism for oversight and quality control of agency science 
and is a practice in widespread use in government, academia and industry.  
“Refereeing procedures,” such as peer review, writes Sheila Jasanoff, “have come 
 
92 MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES (8th ed. 2005), 1120, 37 C.F.R. § 1.211 
(2006). In 2005, 291,221 applications were published. USPTO PERFORMANCE AND 
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2005, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2005/2005annualreport.pdf. 
93 ADAM B. JAFFE AND JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 25ff. (2005). 
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to be regarded as the most effective method of validating science in two quite 
different spheres of professional activity: prepublication review of journal 
articles and screening of applications by federal research sponsoring agencies.  
There is thus an appealing logic to the syllogism that links peer review to “good 
science” in the regulatory process.”94 As we shall discuss, however, the logic is 
fallacious.  Traditional peer review suffers from considerable problems that make 
it ill-suited to remedying the information deficit. 
Through peer review, researchers allow other experts to examine, criticize 
and improve their work.95 This enhances the quality of science and innovation 
while maximizing the efficient use of the scarce resource of time.   Peer review 
allows colleagues to evaluate each other and in so doing to “certify the 
correctness of procedures, establish the plausibility of results, and allocate 
resources."96
94 SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICY MAKERS, 61 (1990). 
95 See Carnegie Commission on Science, Technology, and Government, Risk and the 
Environment: Improving Regulatory Decision Making, Carnegie Commission, New York 
75 (1993).  See, e.g. DeploymentLink, Peer Review Essential for Scientific Advances (Sept. 1, 
2001), available at http://deploymentlink.osd.mil/news/sep01/news_90401_001.shtml
(“Scientists say peer review is a critical quality control principle in the planning, design, 
conduct and interpretation of scientific research. Peer review of research reflects 
scientists' commitment to careful and objective pursuit of knowledge. Through peer 
review, researchers allow other experts to examine, criticize and improve their work.”) 
96 DARRYL J. CHUBIN, EDWARD J. HACKETT, PEERLESS SCIENCE: PEER REVIEW AND U.S. 
SCIENCE POLICY 2 (1990).  
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Peer review97 is in common use in government.98 The National Science 
Foundation and the National Institutes of Health both use peer reviewers to 
determine if research is novel and represents a contribution to its field.99 The 
National Science Foundation currently relies on a network of over 50,000 
reviewers.100 The National Institutes of Health relies on outside review groups 
and advisory councils from the scientific community to review over 70% of its 
applications.101 The Environmental Protection Agency grant selection process 
 
97 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION: COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT AND LOBBYING RESTRICTIONS, GAO/GGD/OGC-00-
18 (Dec. 30 1999); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE PEER REVIEW: COMPLIANCE WITH THE 
PRIVACY ACT AND FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE ACT, GAO/GGD-91-48 (Apr. 17 1991); 
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PEER REVIEW: EPA NEEDS IMPLEMENTATION PROCEDURES 
AND ADDITIONAL CONTROLS, GAO/IRCED-94-98 (Feb. 22 1994); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING 
OFFICE, FEDERAL ADVISORY COMMITTEES: ADDITIONAL GUIDANCE COULD HELP AGENCIES 
BETTER ENSURE INDEPENDENCE AND BALANCE, GAO-04-328, (Apr. 1 2004); U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL RESEARCH: PEER REVIEW PRACTICES AT FEDERAL SCIENCE 
AGENCIES VARY, GAO/RCED-99-99 (Mar. 1 1999); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PEER 
REVIEW: REFORM NEEDED TO ENSURE FAIRNESS IN FEDERAL AGENCY GRANT SELECTION,
GAO/PEMD-94-1 (Jun. 24 1994); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL ADVISORY 
COMMITTEES: GSA'S MANAGEMENT OVERSIGHT AND GAO COMMENTS LEGISLATIVE 
AMENDMENTS, GAO/T-GGD-890 1 (Oct. 5 1998); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
UNIVERSITY FUNDING: INFORMATION ON THE ROLE OF PEER REVIEW AT NSF AND NIH, 
GAO/WED-87-87FS (Mar. 26, 1987); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, FEDERAL ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE ACT: GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION'S MANAGEMENT ADVISORY 
ACTIVITIES, GAO/GGB89-10 (Oct. 5 1988). 
98 See Lars Noah, Scientific “Republicanism”: Expert Peer Review and the Quest for Regulatory 
Deliberation, 49 EMORY L.J. 1033, 1045 (2000). See also, Sidney A. Shapiro, OMB’s Dubious 
Peer Review Procedures, 24 ENVTL. L. REP. 10064  (2004). 
99 Cf. J.B. Ruhl, Prescribing The Right Dose Of Peer Review For the  Endangered Species Act, 83 
NEB. L. REV. (2004) (discussing scientific peer review and arguing against excessive 
reliance on peer review). 
100 National Science Foundation, How We Work (Jul 15, 2005) at 
http://www.nsf.gov/about/how.jsp (last visited Sept. 30, 2005).  See also Thomas O. 
McGarity, Peer Review in Awarding Federal Grants in the Arts and Sciences, 9 BERK. TECH. L.J. 
1, 7 (1994). 
101 See National Institutes of Heath, Center for Scientific Review, at 
http://cms.csr.nih.gov/AboutCSR/Welcome+to+CSR (last updated Aug. 4, 2005).  
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relies heavily upon “Science Review Panels” which are peer review groups 
chosen and managed by an outside scientist.102
Typically, a professional elite103 conducts the peer review that opines on 
work product within the discipline. Governmental peer review is not as far 
ranging as in academia.  Industry and academic peer reviewers are used by 
agencies to vet grant proposals and conduct site visits to university labs.104
Agencies use peer review, according to the General Accounting Office to: “(1) 
assess the merit of competitive and noncompetitive research proposals, (2) 
determine whether to continue or renew research projects, (3) evaluate the 
results of the research prior to the publication of those results, (4) establish 
annual budget priorities for research programs, and (5) evaluate program and 
scientist performance. All of the agencies who use peer review do so to assess 
competitive research proposals for funding (e.g. NIH and NSF use peer review to 
award grants for scientific research) having nothing to do with science in 
policymaking. The methods for conducting peer reviews vary among and within 
 
102 Thomas O. McGarity, Peer Review in Awarding Federal Grants in the Arts and Sciences, 9
BERK. TECH. L.J. 1, 26 (1994). 
103 “Individual agencies define peer review somewhat differently; however, all of the 
agencies’ definitions or descriptions of peer review contained the fundamental concept of 
a review of technical or scientific merit by individuals with sufficient technical 
competence and no unresolved conflict of interest. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PEER 
REVIEW PRACTICES AT FEDERAL SCIENCE AGENCIES VARY, GAO/RCED 99-99 (March 1999), 
available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-99-99. 
104 For example, NSF uses 58,000 peer reviewers each year to study 40,000 proposals and 
submit 250,000 separate evaluations.  See NAT’L. SCI. FOUNDATION, REPORT OF THE 
NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD ON THE NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION’S MERIT REVIEW 
SYSTEM (Sep. 30, 2005), NSB-05-119, available at 
www.nsf.gov/nsb/documents/2005/0930/merit_review.pdf. See also How We Work, 
http://www.nsf.gov.about/how/jsp (last updated July 15, 2005). See also 
STRENGTHENING PEER REVIEW IN FEDERAL AGENCIES THAT SUPPORT EDUCATION RESEARCH,
CENTER FOR EDUCATION (National Academies Press, 2004); Thomas O. McGarity, Peer 
Review In Awarding Federal Grants in the Arts and Sciences, 9 BERK. TECH. L.J. 1, 15 (1994). 
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the agencies. For example, the agencies select peer reviewers from academia, 
private industry, and government and obtain review comments, not only in 
person during site visits, but by mail, in workshops or a combination of 
methods.105 Scientific peer reviewers, however, do not decide policy and, as a 
general matter, they do not set budget priorities or allocate resources (except as 
between research proposals). EPA peer reviewers, for example, oversee the 
scientific research conducted by outside groups for the agency under its Office of 
Research and Development’s $40 million dollar research budget.106 They do not 
necessarily have a voice in decision making.107 In no instance is an agency 
accountable to the scientific community.108
While lawmaking is not under the purview of science, Congress has tried 
to increase the use of peer review (even as it mandates that agencies reduce the 
number of Federal Advisory Committees) in agencies to improve the quality of 
information used and disseminated by them.  The Information Quality Act (IQA) 
legislates that data will be of sufficient quality under the Act and therefore that 
government will be able to make decisions based on that information if, 
according to OMB’s interpretive guidelines of the IQA, it is subjected to 
 
105 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PEER REVIEW PRACTICES AT FEDERAL SCIENCE AGENCIES 
VARY, GAO/RCED 99-99 (March 1999), available at http://www.gao.gov/cgi-
bin/getrpt?GAO/RCED-99-99. 
106 About EPA, http://www.epa.gov/epahome/aboutepa.htm (last updated Aug. 24, 
2005).  
107 Stephen Johnson, Junking the "Junk Science" Law: Reforming the Information Quality Act,
58 ADMIN LAW REV. 37 (2006); see also Michelle V. Lacko, The Data Quality Act: Prologue 
To A Farce Or A Tragedy?, 3 EMORY L.J. 305 (2004).  
108 E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science’s Voice at the EPA, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45, 
58 (2003) (It has become a canon of institutional faith at EPA that scientists should just 
stick to the facts and not make policy recommendations.). 
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independent peer review.109 In its Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer 
Review, OMB set forth detailed requirements for peer review that focused on 
“timing of peer reviews, selection of reviewers, transparency of review, and 
opportunities for public participation.”110 The OMB Guidelines mandate that 
agencies set up peer review processes and involve the public in them.   
This is not a surprising approach since agencies have longstanding 
experience with peer review practices,111 which are, of course, in widespread use 
in the scientific community. “It is an integral practice to the development of 
quality research in the private and public sectors, in industry and in education 
because the process of peer review allows even a large group of scientists, 
regardless of geographic proximity, to collaborate on the evaluation of 
innovation.”112 As Robert Reich, former Secretary of Labor, explains, such 
regularized review processes are well-suited to the workings of administrative 
agencies: “[T]he postwar intellectual and political project in policymaking 
became the reconciliation of the practical necessity of broad administrative 
discretion with this emerging pluralist norm.   The "solution" was found in the 
idea of administrative process. Henceforth, public administrators would become 
managers of neutral processes designed to discover "optimal" public policies.  
 
109 Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Information Quality Guidelines, 67 Fed. Reg. 369 (Jan. 3, 
2002), reissued with corrections, 67 Fed. Reg. 8452, 8459 (Feb. 22, 2002). 
110 Stephen Johnson, Reforming the Information Quality Act, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 60 (2005) 
(quoting Final Information Quality Bulletin for Peer Review, 70 Fed. Reg. 2664, 2671 (Jan 
14, 2005)). 
111 Mohammed Kashef, Scientific Peer Review In The Public Sector (last modified Dec. 5, 
2005), available at http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/peerreview_dec05.pdf.
112 Mohammed Kashef, Scientific Peer Review In The Public Sector (last modified Dec. 5, 
2005), available at http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/peerreview_dec05.pdf. 
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The hallmark of the administrator became procedural expertise in using a set of 
techniques applicable to all sorts of public problems rather than substantive 
expertise in solving particular kinds.”113 As such, peer review represents a fairly 
conservative means to attack the information quality problem and would seem, 
at first glance, to provide the much needed oversight and accountability. 
In fact, peer review is fraught with problems that undermine its 
credibility.114 Were it not for the fact that it can be significantly improved upon, it 
might be caviling to attack governmental peer review, though, leading scientific 
organizations already have.115 First, let us identify the shortcomings in order to 
demonstrate the argument that open review presents the better alternative.   
 
113 Robert Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 
YALE L.J. 1617, 1619 (1985). 
114 SHEILA JASANOFF, THE FIFTH BRANCH: SCIENCE ADVISORS AS POLICY MAKERS (1990); 
Wendy Wagner, The "Bad Science" Fiction: Reclaiming the Debate over the Role of Science in 
Public Health and Environmental Regulation, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 63, 67ff. (2003) 
(criticizing how “good science” reforms attempt to promote greater peer review); Sidney 
A. Shapiro, Peer Review and the Politicization of Government Science, in RESCUING SCIENCE 
FROM POLITICS, (Wendy Wagner, Rena Steinzor, eds., 2006), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=910915. 
115 See OMB Watch, Peer Review News, available at 
http://www.ombwatch.org/article/archive/232  (archive of objections to OMB peer 
review guidelines).  See also Defending Science, OMB’s Peer Review Guidelines, at 
http://www.defendingscience.org/public_health_regulations/peer_review_guidelines.c
fm (last visited Aug. 30, 2006).  See also Chris Mooney, The Politics of Peer Review, in 
Committee for the Scientific Investigation of Claims of the Paranormal (Jan. 8, 2004), 
available at http://www.csicop.org/doubtandabout/peerreview/ (“Given all this, you 
might expect that a recent White House Office of Management and Budget proposal to 
expand the use of peer review in the evaluation of scientific research conducted by 
federal agencies would find a warm welcome from scientists. You'd be dead wrong. 
Scientific heavyweights like the American Public Health Association, the Association of 
American Medical Colleges, and the Federation of American Societies for Experimental 
Biology have issued scathing critiques of the proposal (the latter two jointly), as have a 
range of other organizations and experts. The hallowed American Association for the 
Advancement of Science--which publishes the preeminent peer reviewed journal Science-
-also has worries about the idea. A group of Democratic members of Congress even 
dubbed it a "wolf in sheep's clothing."). 
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The problems of traditional peer review stem from the fact that it is an 
elite, closed process and therefore subject to manipulation.  Not necessarily 
closed in the sense of secretive,116 but in the sense that agency peer review groups 
are empanelled not self-selected.   It is therefore possible to stack the deck with 
ideologues and to create peer review mechanisms that are fraught, not with 
deliberative disagreement, but unproductive conflict.   Because the membership 
of these groups is closed, the community itself has no say over who participates.  
Typically, only certain kinds of industry and academic experts will be invited.  
Those limitations need not be based on politics – though a political litmus test is 
frequently imposed117 – but may, however, be based on status and thereby shut 
out otherwise qualified participants with meaningful contributions.   
There is no single set of procedures that define peer review.  Its practice 
varies widely across agencies.  Hence there are no required mechanisms to 
ensure transparency in the work of agency peer reviewers.  The mere fact that 
these panels share the name “peer review” with that of rigorous academic 
counterparts does not ensure the quality of their work (nor that of academic peer 
review).  There are no assurances that what they do is based on good science 
rather than political prejudice. GAO has found that "further improvements are 
needed to expand the scope of peer reviews [at EPA] and make them more 
 
116 The purpose of the Federal Advisory Committee Act is to ensure that advice rendered 
by advisory committees is open and accessible. Federal Advisory Committee Act, Pub. L. 
92-463, 5 U.S.C., App 2 6(c) (2) (2006). 
117 To serve on the NIH Drug Abuse panel, candidates were asked if they had voted for 
President Bush.  See William R. Miller, Litmus Test for Appointees at the National Institute on 
Drug Abuse, available at http://www.ucsusa.org/scientific_integrity/interference/nih-
drug-abuse-panel.html (last updated Aug 10, 2005). 
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independent," and that the implementation of EPA's peer-review policy has been 
"uneven."118
Peer review is also time-consuming to organize119 and to run.120 Because 
the group has to be selected, vetted and approved and fights can arise over 
membership, it is a difficult process.  Conflicts of interest have to be identified 
and sorted out.  Participants have to be convinced to join.  Not only does the 
composition of the group need to be selected and defended, but the scope of its 
work can be contested.  Hence, setting up peer review panels requires boundary 
setting and policing and the defense of those boundaries.  
It is, perhaps, in part because of the work that must go into maintaining a 
peer review system that review generally happens late – too late in the process to 
have a maximum impact on regulatory decision making.  The same complaint is 
frequently leveled against citizen participation practices more generally.   
 
118 Alan Charles Raul and Julie Zampa Dwyer, Science in the Regulatory Process, 66 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 7, n.24 (2003) ([The] GAO has "identified several weaknesses in EPA's 
science programs over the years, including (1) the uneven implementation of peer review 
procedures for EPA's scientific and technical products, (2) gaps in scientific data, and (3) 
the lack of performance goals and measures that show the environmental results of EPA's 
science activities.") (quoting U.S GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 
AND RESULTS ACT: INFORMATION ON SCIENCE ISSUES IN EPA’S PERFORMANCE REPORT FOR 
FISCAL YEAR 1999 AND PERFORMANCE PLANS FOR FISCAL YEARS 2000 AND 2001, Pub. No. 
00-270 ,(2000)). 
119 Sidney Shapiro, Data Quality: The Data Quality Appropriations Rider: New Procedures and 
Information Disclosure , Center for Progressive Reform at 
http://www.progressiveregulation.org/perspectives/dataQuality.cfm (last visited 
August 14, 2006) (“While ensuring high-quality information is a worthy goal, procedural 
requirements have an important side effect – they slow down the government’s capacity 
to act and, if they are sufficiently burdensome, they can bring government to a standstill. 
As a result, the benefits of imposing additional procedures have to be balanced against 
the consequences to the public of delaying agency action.”).   
120Megan Sever, Government Peer Review, GEOTIMES (Nov. 2003), available at 
http://www.agiweb.org/geotimes/nov03/NN_peerrev.html (“Opponents, however, 
warn that the standards could paralyze new regulations, especially on issues such as 
global warming, or air or water pollution, where the risks and benefits are complex, 
politically charged and potentially costly.”) 
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Agencies ask for public comment once a rule is already written, often allotting 
the public a short window in which to provide feedback and leaving little room 
for meaningful change.121 As Raul and Dwyer comment: “[I]n many cases, end-
of-the-line review cannot repair mistakes or omissions made early in the 
regulatory development process or fill data gaps. Back-end inspection may be 
able to identify scientific uncertainties, but rarely can it reduce them. The benefits 
of regulatory science quality control must also be balanced against the potential 
for peer reviewers to intrude on the policy domain. If determining whether the 
data and analysis are adequate for regulatory decision making is the problem, 
then peer review does not solve the problem. It shifts the problem from decision 
makers to reviewers.”122
But the closed process fits well with the culture and practice of agencies. 
“By deferring to expertise and asserting it ourselves, we help create a world 
organized around the pretense that some people, armed and limited by their 
special knowledge, can be trusted to be in charge.”123 The peer review process 
arguably shores up this self-proclaimed expertise by lending credibility to the 
agency’s assertion of expert knowledge.  Frug goes on to point out, quoting  the 
moral philosopher, Alasdair MacIntyre,  that “'Bureaucratic Man' can thrive only 
 
121 The Administrative Procedure Act provides for a minimum window of 30 days of 
public consultation.  See 5 U.S.C. § 554(d) (2006).  
122 See Alan Charles Raul and Julie Zampa Dwyer, Science in the Regulatory Process, 66 L. &
CONTEMP. PROB. 7, 13 (2003). 
123 Gerald Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1276, 1333 
(1984). 
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if all of us invent a fiction of expertise that assigns to the character of the 'broad-
gauged' leader a role that justifies our own powerlessness.”124
Part IV: The Open Review Alternative125
We need institutional processes by which to overcome the problems of 
closed peer review and create more transparent mechanisms that bring scientific 
expertise to bear earlier in the process.   We have witnessed how the combination 
of open technology and well-defined process has enabled Wikipedia to elicit the 
wisdom of the crowd and led to the creation of an encyclopedia with over 
1,000,000 entries of quality comparable to that of traditional encyclopedias with 
centralized editors.126 New technology has enabled Amazon to create a 
marketplace, not just for the sale of goods and services, but also for the 
aggregation of expertise and recommendations about those goods and services.127
CNet offers a platform to broker expertise about electronics and technology.  The 
 
124 Gerald Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV.1276, 1333 
(1984). 
125 For a complete description of the Peer to Patent proposal, please see Beth S. Noveck, 
Peer to Patent, 20 HARV. J. L. TECH. ___ (2006); see also Nicholas Varchaver, Patent Review 
Goes Wiki, FORTUNE MAGAZINE, Aug. 21, 2006, at 18, available at 
http://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/2006/08/21/8383639/ind
ex.htm?source=yahoo_quote. 
126 See Wikipedia, at http://www.wikipedia.org (as of this writing, there are 1,312,000 
entries).  See Jim Giles, Internet Encyclopaedias Go Head To Head 
Jimmy Wales' Wikipedia Comes Close To Britannica In Terms Of The Accuracy Of Its Science 
Entries, A Nature Investigation Finds, NATURE (Dec. 14, 2005; updated March 28, 2006) 
(revealing that study by Nature demonstrates that Wikipedia is about as inaccurate as 
Encyclopedia Britannica). 
127 See Shay David and Trevor Pinch, Six Degrees of Separation: The Use and Abuse of Online 
Review and Recommendation Systems, FIRST MONDAY (March 2006) (describing strategies 
and techniques of user reviews and recommendations on Amazon). 
Scientific Expertise, Open Review and Patent Reform 
 
47
Internet Movie Database, the largest repository of information about cinema, is 
created by volunteers submitting data about films and movie stars.128 Public 
Library of Science,  the pioneering open access publisher of scientific journals, is 
launching PLoS One, a distributed knowledge network to enable scholars of 
biology and medicine to discuss published research literature.129 We are learning 
as a result of these experiences with online collaboration that often “ordinary” 
people possess extraordinary knowledge they are willing to share when it is easy 
to do.130 This peer-production of content works well online.131 By making 
participation open and subject to self-selection, we can leverage, not only the 
wisdom, but also the enthusiasm of the crowd.132 Experience with the tools now 
available is undermining traditional assumptions about how expertise must be 
organized and pointing the way toward open models of scientific review, not 
 
128 Internet Movie Database, available at http://www.imdb.com. See also Internet Movie 
Database entry on Wikipedia, available at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IMDB (“The 
IMDb website consists of the largest known single accumulation of data on individual 
films (including complete cast and crew listings), television programs (including 
complete cast and crew listings), direct-to-video product and videogames reaching back 
to their respective beginnings, and worldwide in scope… Information is largely provided 
by a cadre of volunteer contributors, with only 17 members of the staff dedicated to 
monitoring the data received) (last updated Aug. 15, 2006). 
129 http://www.plos.org/news/announce_plosone.html 
130 Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a Political Economy of Information, 52 
DUKE L.J. 1245, 1256 (2003) (stating that peer production is the collaborative process by 
which individuals "contribute to a joint effort" to produce "information or culture"). 
131 131 See Yochai Benkler, Coase's Penguin, or, Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE 
L.J. 369 (2002) (discussing collaboration in the context of open source, and other peer-
review projects). 
132 JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF THE CROWD (2004) (demonstrating how groups of 
people can be smarter and more effective at certain kinds of decisions than individuals). 
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only to create encyclopedias or book reviews,133 but also – and this is the radical 
proposal – to inform legal decision making.  
First, we will outline how an open peer review process for patent 
examination could work and then, we will discuss the advantages of such a 
change for the way the agency operates.  The goal is not to outline technical 
details of the policy proposal but to illuminate the normative and practice 
desirability of openness by reference to some of the key design features.134 If we 
are to succeed in lobbying for a move away from peer review and toward open 
review, we need to demonstrate exactly how it addresses the problems of a 
closed system. 
The proposed system for open review directly addresses the problems 
with the current examination process, including the “goldilocks dilemma” by 
enabling the community of practice to collaborate on finding prior art, evaluating 
the application and transforming the “person skilled in the art” from a fictional 
 
133 MediaCommons, a new endeavor from the Institute for the Future of the Book, will 
involve communication studies scholars in real-time open  peer review, see Kathleen 
Fitzpatrick, Introducing MediaCommons 
http://www.futureofthebook.org/blog/archives/2006/07/introducing_mediacommons
_or_ti.html (July 17, 2006). 
134 There are existing examples of patent commentary websites, though these are not 
linked to Patent Office decision making.  See Prevalent.de Software Patents, available at 
http://prevalent.de/index.pl?site=1&subsite=3&lang=en. See also CAMBIA Patent 
Lens, which offers patent searching and will eventually offer annotation, available at 
http://www.patentlens.net/daisy/patentlens/patentlens.html (“The Patent Lens 
contains patent documents from the European and United States patent offices and filed 
under the Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT)  in a format that is fully integrated and 
searchable.  The Patent Lens also offers technology landscapes, which describe key areas 
of plant biotechnology and the patent claims surrounding them.  In addition you will 
find patent tutorials, information on patent policies, and news and views in the world of 
IP.”)  See also PatentWiki, http://www.patentwiki.org. 
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legal personage into a real group.135 This system augments review by the lone 
examiner with assistance from experts in the relevant art area, revolutionizing 
the way patents are examined and providing a model for expert participation in 
regulatory decision making.136 The United States Patent and Trademark Office 
has adopted the proposal as part of its Strategic Initiatives and will launch a pilot 
of open review in 2007.137 The European Patent Office (EPO) is considering 
following suit.  The project has captured the imagination of some of the world’s 
largest and most active patent holders, who have agreed to let some of their own 
patents be reviewed openly.  These include: IBM, Microsoft, Oracle, Intel, 
Hewlett-Packard and Red Hat. 
It is illogical to have one person – with access to limited information – 
determining originality138 and whether the inventor slept on his rights139 as well as 
 
135 For related earlier proposals pertaining to patent bounties, see John R. Thomas, 
Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 305 (2001) (arguing that awarding prior art informants with a bounty assessed 
against applicants, the Patent Office can restore order to the patent system and reduce its 
social costs.); Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for 
Defeating Patents, 19 BERK. TECH L.J. 667 (2004).   See also Michael Felton, A Call for Bounty 
Hunters, in Patents and Property (March 2001), available at 
http://pubs.acs.org/subscribe/journals/mdd/v04/i03/html/03patents.html. 
136 ADAM B. JAFFE AND JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS 22 (2005) (“"Until 
the process is changed so that other parties that know something about the technology 
surrounding a given application have the opportunity and incentive to bring that 
knowledge forward, there will be no cost-effective way to fix the problem of low quality 
patents."). 
137 See U.S.P.T.O. Draft Strategic Plan 2007-2012, 71 Fed. Reg. 50048 (2006), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2007/index.htm.
138 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2004) (novelty). 
139 Egbert v. Lippmann. 104 U.S. 333, 337 (1881) (“The invention, forming the springs of 
corsets of two or more metallic plates, placed one upon another, and so connected as to 
prevent them from sliding off each other laterally or edgewise, was completed and put to 
use in 1855. The inventor slept on his rights for eleven years. Letters-patent were not 
applied for till March, 1866.”). 
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obviousness140 or even enablement141 when we can harness the collective 
intelligence and experience of thousands. Many technological advances are not 
described in commonly available academic publications or those sources to 
which the patent examiner has easy access. It is also illogical to turn to a single 
firm, as the Patent Office once suggested, to conduct this review when those with 
the deepest experience in any given area of innovation and bring their expertise 
to bear.142
The pilot will focus on creating an online system to assist with novelty 
review by allowing for the submission of prior art.  The novelty determination is 
ideally-suited to peer review because it enunciates a clear goal, requires only 
minimal participation to address and lends itself to self-selection on the basis of 
expertise.143 Far better for me to designate what I am good at since I am in the 
best position to know.144 While a patent examiner might have to search for prior 
art for hours, an expert knows instantly whether an invention is reminiscent of 
earlier work or avenues of research.  Designed right, the software can make 
participation for a network of scientific and innovation experts clear and easy.  
 
140 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2004) (non-obviousness). 
141 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2004) (enablement). 
142 USPTO, The 21st Century Strategic Plan (2003) (To achieve greater examiner 
productivity by reducing their prior art search responsibilities, the USPTO is looking at 
market driven examination options.) at  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/comp/proc/pctsearch/pctsearchhom.html 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2005).  
143 See STEVEN WEBER, THE SUCCESS OF OPEN SOURCE 62 (2004) (“The key element of the 
open source process, as an ideal type, is voluntary participation and voluntary selection 
of tasks.”). 
144 See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 
(1970) (Calabresi discusses the notion that the entity in the best position to carry the 
“burden” is the one that should.). 
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As Eric Raymond, hacker “anthropologist” phrased it, with many 
eyeballs “all bugs are shallow.”  Just as a community of open source 
programmers is well-suited to spotting mistakes in code, the peer to patent 
community is equipped to address whether an invention is novel or resembles 
something seen before.  A prior art novelty review is an opportunity to get more 
public input into the patent system and introduce citizen consultation, the 
common and required practice of every government agency,145 into the 
intellectual property review process.146
Once an application is published to the Web (under current rules, this 
happens at eighteen months,147 though an applicant can consent to earlier 
publication),148 it can be pushed out to the relevant experts. Using RSS (really 
simple syndication)149 those with an interest in a particular area of art, whether it 
 
145 Administrative Procedure Act §1, 5 USCS § 553 (b) (1946) (General notice of proposed 
rule making shall be published in the Federal Register, unless persons subject thereto are 
named and either personally served or otherwise have actual notice thereof in 
accordance with law.) See also, 5 USCS § 553 (c) (1946) (After notice required by this 
section, the agency shall give interested persons an opportunity to participate in the rule 
making through submission of written data, views, or arguments with or without 
opportunity for oral presentation.).   On the application of administrative law to the 
patent system, see Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent 
System can Learn from Administrative Law 
146 USPTO, The 21st Century Strategic Plan (2003) (To achieve greater examiner 
productivity by reducing their prior art search responsibilities, the USPTO is looking at 
market driven examination options, including outsourcing prior art review to private 
firms) at  
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/comp/proc/pctsearch/pctsearchhom.html 
(last visited Sept. 30, 2005).  
147 37 C.F.R. § 1.211 (2006). 
148 37 C.F.R. § 1.219 (2006). 
149 While the Patent Office does not offer syndication, a private website, Fresh Patents 
does.  See http://www.freshpatents.com (last visited October 19, 2005). See also 
Introduction to RSS, (revised April 14, 2003) (Really Simple Syndication (RSS) is an XML 
format designed for sharing headlines and other Web content. RSS defines an XML 
grammar for sharing content. Each RSS text file contains both static information about a 
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is class 482 Exercise Devices or class 438 Semiconductor Device Manufacturing,150
can receive notification of the name and abstract of any new inventions filed via 
newsreader, email or mobile phone for initial review.  This makes it simple, not 
only to learn about published applications, but also to share that information 
with others since it is the expert in the community of practice who will know 
who and how to find the other experts with knowledge of a particular area of art. 
Information visualization tools make it simpler to evaluate the volume of 
information and the frequency of communication to facilitate participation.  
Visualization aids will make it easier for a subscriber – whether it is an industry 
or academic scientist, a graduate student or professor or a competitive inventor 
and her lawyers – to see the quantity of applications historically published in 
each class and sub-class in order to know how broadly to subscribe and avoid 
being overwhelmed.  One needs to know in advance that Class 514 Drug, Bio-
Affecting and Body Treating Compositions, is the most populous class, and that 
one ought to sign up for relevant sub-classes, or that Needle and Pin Making 
received only 1 application last year.  
The system will promote “lonely patents” by advertising under-
subscribed patent classes and subclasses for review to the network of experts.  It 
might employ a collaborative filtering system akin to Amazon’s to suggest 
 
website or weblog, plus dynamic information about new stories, all surrounded by 
matching start and end tags) at  
http://www.webreference.com/authoring/languages/xml/rss/intro/ (last visited Sept. 
30, 2005).  For more about the use of RSS in government, see http://www.rssgov.com
(last visited December 5, 2005). 
150 The Patent Classification System can be found online arranged alphabetically, by 
subject matter, by class number and by art unit.  See, Patent Classification System, 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/opc/. 
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patents to review (e.g. “people who submitted prior art for this patent also read 
that patent.”).  Experts will receive RSS or email notifications of patents for 
which no prior art has yet been submitted.  Reviewing one patent application 
will generate a prompt: “Would you like to review another?”  Again, if the 
system is designed to optimize inputs and facilitate participation, it can reduce 
the burden of reviewing a patent for novelty and commenting on prior art.   
 
In addition, reviewers can “tag” or label applications, not only according 
to the official classification taxonomy, but also by their own designations.  This 
kind of supplementary community self-tagging – or what is sometimes called a 
“folks-onomy”151 – might make it easier to find applications of interest by 
allowing experts to apply other labels to identify an invention in the terminology 
that is common to his or her specialty.  In other words, what the patent office 
calls Exercise Devices, may commonly be known among physical therapists as 
elliptical machines.  What the Patent Office might refer to as semi-conductor 
manufacture, the reviewer might also label “chip.”  Such a folksonomy could 
make labeling more granular and precise to speed up the process of self-
assignment.152 We already have tagging and labeling software, most commonly 
 
151 For more on folksonomies, see Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Folksonomy
(last updated January 1, 2006). See also, Clay Shirky, Ontology is Overrated: Categories, 
Links, and Tags, at http://www.shirky.com/writings/ontology_overrated.html (last 
visited January 2, 2006). 
152 “Zoo Bank” is creating just such a user-created taxonomy and classification system in 
another arena.  The technique and the technology could be used to classify inventions.  
See Commentary: A Universal Register for Animal Names, 437 NATURE 477 (Sep. 22, 2005).  
The Open Source Development Lab has launched the “Open Source Software as Prior 
Art” project which aims to use tagging to make open source software more available to 
patent examiners (“The goal is to reduce the number of poor quality patents that issue by 
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known from photo-sharing services such as Flickr, that allows Internet users to 
label content for easier retrieval, indexing and searching.153 
Figure 1 – Open Review Pilot Process 
 
Each application will reside on a web page where members of the 
community of practice and interest can submit relevant prior art for a two-month 
 
increasing accessibility to Open Source Software code and documentation that can be 
used as prior art during the patent examination process. For the Open Source community 
and many others, this means a reduction in the number of software patents that can be 
used to threaten software developers and users, and a resulting increase in innovation.”), 
available at http://developer.osdl.org/dev/priorart/.  
153 See del.icio.us About Page, http://del.icio.us/doc/about (last visited Sept. 30. 2005). 
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window after publication.154 Two months tracks the amount of time currently 
available to members of the public wishing to submit prior art under CFR Rule 
1.99155 (though this could just as well be three or four months).  Rule 1.99 
provides that third parties can submit prior art within that two month window 
and after paying a fee.  To enable prior art peer review, as we are describing 
here, the Patent Office, at least initially, has agreed to waive the filing fee of $180 
to facilitate submission of art. 
More significantly, two months creates a manageable window of time in 
which to learn about and submit prior art without overwhelming the examiner 
or the community with too much data to review.  By delimiting the time for 
submission of prior art, this could aid the examiner while drastically accelerating 
the process of review from the average 2-4 years156 that the Patent Office 
currently requires.  By speeding up the review process, we also speed up the 
 
154 There once existed a private service known as BountyQuest where inventors could 
post an application and pay for third parties to submit prior art as a mechanism to 
strengthen the quality of the application and find any prior art before the fact. See Sabra 
Chartrand, Patents: Disproving Idea Ownership, N.Y. TIMES, October 23, 2000, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/23/technology/23PATE.html?ex=1143262800&en=
b13756e07e50dd38&ei=5070. See also John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in 
the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305, 307 (2001) 
(proposing “that the Patent Office recruit members of the public to act as private patent 
examiners. By awarding prior art informants with a bounty assessed against applicants, 
the Patent Office can restore order to the patent system and reduce its social costs.”) 
155 37 CFR § 1.99 (2004). 
156 See U.S.P.T.O. Draft Strategic Plan 2007-2012, 71 Fed. Reg. 50048 (2006), available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/strat2007/index.htm (Patent pendency now 
averages more than 30 months and is expected to increase to 33.8 months (to issue) in 
2011).  In some areas, patent pendency is as high as 43.5 months.  See 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/annual/2005/060404_table4.html (2005). 
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time for scientists to publish and publicly discuss innovation without the fear of 
triggering a statutory bar.157 
To submit prior art, a member of the community will log onto the system.  
That logon need not be verified or even persistent.  We want a small hurdle to 
prevent junk from being submitted but not so high a hurdle as to create a 
stumbling block to participation.  At this stage of the game, the Patent Office 
ought to want good prior art from anywhere and anyone who has it.  It does not 
matter if the party is interested or dispassionate.  In fact, competitive interest will 
be a driver and incentive to finding relevant prior art and participating in the 
system. 
The design of the system will enable the community to designate the 
claims that are the crux of the invention.  An application might recite a method 
for sending and receiving electronic signals by means of a special hash 
algorithm.  The examiner does not need prior art pertaining to sending and 
receiving, which are common steps.  Rather, the Community’s attention should 
be directed to finding prior art pertaining to the hash algorithm. If the 
community identifies the central claims, there is a role to play, not only for 
scientists, but also for lawyers as stewards of this process that mixes knowledge 
of law with a knowledge of science. 
Second, directions, instruction and even moderation by members of the 
community are essential at every step in the process to create a strong ethos of 
 
157 35 U.SC. §102 (b); 35 U.SC. §102 (e);   (Section contains three different patent bars; the 
“printed publication” bar, the “on-sale” bar, and the public use bar. See also, Midland 
Flour Milling Co. v Bobbitt, 70 F.2d. 416 (1934) (holding prior publications rest upon 
same ground as prior patents so far as anticipation is concerned and no valid patent can 
be obtained if invention or device is disclosed in printed publication.)  
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community and encourage the submission of useful and appropriate materials.  
Wikipedia uses various mechanisms from written directions to open community 
peer review and deletion to warning labels158 to ensure that entries posted are, in 
fact, appropriate for an encyclopedia and adhere to standards of quality. The 
Wikipedia community has evolved a clear and explicit sense of its mission and a 
set of rules for writing encyclopedia entries.  Similarly, a peer review system for 
patents has to make very clear to participants what is expected of them.  The 
software itself will reject entries without references or sources or with a prior art 
date that post-dates the invention.  But the community itself can play a role by 
voting good prior art up and irrelevant submissions down. 
Third, the interface will be designed to require a submitter to identify the 
claim to which a piece of prior art pertains.159 This will make participation easier 
to review and more manageable for the examiner by allowing him to winnow 
out prior art that relates to claims about which he needs no information.  It also 
makes it easier, especially for a patent with dozens of claims, for the examiner 
and the community to assess the relevance of that submission.  “This article 
invalidates claim 3” is more useful than “this article invalidates this patent.” 
 
158 Katherine Mangu-Ward, The Neutrality of this Article is Disputed, REASONONLINE (Aug 
15, 2006), available at http://www.reason.com/links/links081506.shtml (“early every 
Wikipedia user has occasionally come across a little tag at the top of an article: "Stop!" it 
says, "The neutrality of this article is disputed. Please see the discussion on the talk page." 
This little tag, I'm convinced, is the secret to Wikipedia's success. And I'm not alone.). 
159 In the search report filed by an examiner performing a review under the PCT (Patent 
Cooperation Treaty), the examiner cites prior art with the appropriate and relevant 
passages noted, indicates the claim to which such prior art speaks and labels the 
submission with one of 9 codes, including X, Y or A where X stands for novelty, Y stands 
for obviousness and A stands for general state of the art.  See International Search Report 
Model Form at U.S.P.T.O., PARTS, FORM, AND CONTENT OF APPLICATION, MANUAL OF 
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURES (MPEP)  §1844.01 (8th ed. 2004). 
Scientific Expertise, Open Review and Patent Reform 
 
58
Fourth, as on Slashdot where peers moderate each other’s postings in 
order to enable readers to filter out quality comments as adjudged by the 
community, members of the peer to patent community should rank the prior art 
for relevance. The output at the end of the process will be a rank-ordered list of 
prior art, identifying the top ten submissions as judged by the community. 
Participation might require a minimum of three ratings.  Incentives can be built 
into the software, as Slashdot does,160 to encourage ongoing rating and ranking.  
This has the effect of winnowing the submissions and making them more useful 
and manageable to the examiner.  The examiner will still have access to the full 
list, which he can search, as he would any database, but, in this case, the database 
will have been ordered not by machine but by people with relevant expertise. 
Finally, earlier experience with peer review systems teaches that 
participation will be enhanced through status and reward.  Members of the 
community who post useful information will receive “karma effects,”161 status 
points for submitting prior art that is deemed relevant by the community.162 
160 The Slashdot news site allows its members to rate postings in order to enable other 
members to sort content based on member reviews.  Good information, as determined by 
that community and within the context of its own culture and values, rises to the top.  
See Slashdot Comments and Moderation FAQ at http://slashdot.org/faq/com-
mod.shtml (last visited Aug. 15, 2006). 
161 For more on the role of status and reputation in fostering collective action, see Paul 
Resnick et al., Reputation Systems, 43 COMMUN. OF THE ACM 45, 46 (Dec. 2000); See also 
Peter Kollock, The Production of Trust in Online Markets, in 16 ADVANCES IN GROUP 
PROCESSES (E.J.  Lawler, M. Macy, S. Thyne & H.A. Walker eds., 1999); Paul Resnick, 
Impersonal Sociotechnical Capital, ICT’s, and Collective Action Among Strangers, in 
TRANSFORMING ENTERPRISE: THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF INFORMATION 
TECHNOLOGY 399, (William H. Dutton, Brian Kahin, Ramon O’Callaghan & Andrew 
Wyckoff, eds., 2004). 
162 There are numerous existing social reputation software systems. Some of these 
websites focus on social or dating relationships and offer rating systems whereby people 
are “rated” based on who they know and who their friends are. In other words, the 
wildly popular Friendster or Orkut provide a graphical map of my friendships. Cyworld, 
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Status and reputation are essential to building the trust in the community 
necessary for iterative interaction.163 It is also crucial for determining 
qualifications for participation and for creating an incentive to ongoing 
collaboration.  The currently prevailing wisdom is that social reputation software 
and other automated mechanisms for according status is the way to foster and 
find such expertise. Reputation points on EBay, karma points on Slashdot, 
honorifics in academic circles, all of these status mechanisms create an incentive 
to participation and help to inculcate norms within the group.  The peer patent 
review system will also need to evolve mechanisms of conferring status on those 
people who participate well and shoulder their burden.164 Reputation points 
help to encourage active participation.  It might come to be an important part, for 
example, of being a graduate student in a field or being a junior scientist in a 
corporation working in a particular area of art.  One gets rewarded for 
 
another social networking service boasts a quarter of the population of Korea as its user 
base. Linked In provides such a map for my business relationships. Epinions bills itself as 
a “web of trust” system. It allows me to create a network of trusted reviewers. Slashdot 
moderates its site based on similar principles. The community decides which 
contributors and content is best and that information rises to the top. Virtual worlds, like 
Second Life, have a social reputation system based on interactions between players. 
Kuro5hin which uses mojo to allow users to moderate the site. Mojo is a time-weighted 
average of comment ratings, in order to set the "initial" rating for each new comment. 
Time spent with another player indicates friendship. New publishing models also rely 
heavily on social reputation software to filter content. Outfoxed is a service that “uses 
your network of trusted friends and experts to help you find the good stuff and avoid the 
bad” by using social reputation as a criterion in web surfing. There is already a wide 
variety of social reputation tools even though we are just at the beginning of their 
evolution and are sure to see the development of a wide new array of technological 
structures designed to measure social reputation.  See Beth Simone Noveck, Trademark 
Law and the Social Construction of Trust: Creating the Legal Framework for On-Line Identity, 84 
WASH. U. L. Q. __ (2006). 
163 See Beth Simone Noveck, Trademark Law and the Social Construction of Trust: Creating the 
Legal Framework for On-Line 84 WASH. U. L. Q. __ (2006) (arguing that reputation systems 
are crucial to fostering trust in online environments). 
164 See Paul Resnick et al., Reputation Systems, 43 COMM’N. OF THE ACM (Dec. 2000). 
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submitting art deemed relevant by the community and even more points for art 
that is eventually used in the final determination by the examiner.  By tying 
status to relevance, the institution of online peer review can encourage, not only 
participation per se, but better quality participation and the submission of art 
that is useful and practical. 
 
Part V: Why Open Review 
 
The open review system being constructed by the USPTO allows: 1) 
submission of prior art and commentary in response to the pending application 
of a consenting applicant; 2) where the community identifies the claims that are 
most relevant; and 3) directions and tutorials create a strong ethos of community 
and a clear indication about how to participate; and 4) participation is chunked 
into manageable tasks, including the rating and ranking of other people’s 
postings in order to produce a manageable top 10 list of prior art submissions; 
and 5) successful participation, as determined by an examiner’s use of submitted 
prior art, generates positive reputation points.  This, in short, is the outline of an 
open system that overcomes the problems of closed peer review while providing 
more information into the decision making process in a manageable form. 
The advantages to open review are myriad and we will discuss each one 
of these in turn.  In sum, it: 
• Eliminates the institutional and status boundaries of expertise 
• Reduces the work of administering peer review or public participation 
and potentially accelerates decision making 
Scientific Expertise, Open Review and Patent Reform 
 
61
• Improves decision making for the better by opening up the flow of 
information while making it manageable 
• Makes government more accountable to science 
• Ensures that decisions comport with scientific fact 
• Will not only make more science available, it will reveal debates over that 
science 
• Introduces information into the process early 
• Obviates the need to await litigation to challenge the basis of decision 
making 
• Promotes deliberation around issues of national importance 
• Increases oversight over the regulatory process 
• Is more expert and more participatory 
"When a handful of distinguished gentlemen came together in post-
Restoration England to set up the Royal Society, they agreed that membership 
should be open only to the better sort.  Allowing tradesmen and artisans to join 
the collective search for truth seemed too dangerous to be tolerated, for, after all, 
the worldly interests of such people might corrupt their decisions about what 
counted as genuine knowledge."165 Open review abandons this now-outdated 
vision of expertise.  In so doing, it can eliminate the problems of lack-of-
transparency and manipulation that plague closed peer review panels because it 
opens up the process via the Internet, allowing peer reviewers to self-select, 
rather than to be selected.  If the aim is to get at good prior art, it does not matter 
 
165 PHILIP KITCHER, SCIENCE, TRUTH AND DEMOCRACY 29 (2001). 
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where it comes from so long as it is provided.  Often, the best wisdom comes, not 
from the center, but from the periphery among the enthusiasts and hobbyists or 
from graduate students who are immersed in but not yet well known for their 
knowledge of the discipline.  Opening up review also reduces the burden on any 
one group of people over time by increasing the number of people potentially 
engaged in the process. 
In addition, opening up the process and eliminating closed boundaries 
not only introduces more and better information from new sources, but it also 
exercises a self-policing effect.  Participants are not constrained by professional 
allegiances nor do they become entrenched in the culture and practices of a 
small, closed group.  Scholarly debates are open playing-fields where everyone 
participates in a common conversation. Similarly, an open system for science in 
policymaking would provide greater accountability among scientists to each 
other, regardless of whether they are in academia, industry or the public sector. 
While there is an up front cost to setting up the software and the 
processes by which open review will be conducted, it minimizes the workload 
after the fact.  There is no need to empanel juries or to police their boundaries.  
As in the “Peer to Patent” system, the software can do the work of rating and 
ranking participants and promoting the best submissions, as decided by the 
community, to the front of the queue for consideration.  If the work to be done is 
made as granular as possible, it further reduces the workload by allowing more 
people to participate for less time.  
It will potentially improve decision making by opening up the flow of 
information from the public and from the scientific community while, at the 
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same time, leveraging technology to make that flow manageable for participants 
and government officials alike.   The Peer to Patent Proposal166 suggests 
transmitting only the top 10 items of prior art, as identified by the community, to 
the patent examiner.  We need to start exploring ways to embed procedure into 
software in order to make public participation practicable and in order to let the 
community itself participate in vetting the quality of information. 
Having such processes readily deployable will make it possible to render 
government more accountable to the scientific community and to integrate legal 
and scientific considerations.  It is possible and desirable, not to eliminate the 
patent examiner, but to create a dialogue between the process of scientific fact-
finding and legal fact-finding.   Given that in the U.S. Patent Office (unlike 
Europe) most examiners possess only an undergraduate degree in a science (and 
not necessarily related to the area in which they examine) and that in other 
agencies, “very few of the participants in the policymaking dialogue at high 
levels within the Agency were scientifically trained,"167 open review integrated 
into the decision making process creates mechanisms to inform the work of the 
bureaucrat. Organizing the voice of science places added pressure on agencies to 
make accountable decisions.  It also reduces the risk of manipulation of science 
by the agency. 
Trying to separate science from law, as we have tried to do for so long, is 
self-defeating.  Science and policy are inextricably linked and should be.  We 
 
166 Peer to Patent proposal, please see Beth S. Noveck, Peer to Patent, 20 HARV. J. L. TECH.
___ (2006), available at http://dotank.nyls.edu/communitypatent/proposals.html. 
167 DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON 210 (2005) 
(quoting E. Donald Elliott, former EPA general counsel). 
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need the mechanisms by which to let both areas of expertise inform but not 
confuse or corrupt the way we make policy. We want to guard against regulatory 
capture while, at the same time, harnessing collective expertise to advance the 
public interest.  “If told that it is improper to make policy recommendations, 
scientific groups are much more likely to smuggle in their policy predilections 
covertly, either consciously or unconsciously. We would be far better advised to 
invite scientific advisory bodies to separate their scientific conclusions from their 
policy recommendations, and to empower them to address both.168 
The way to do this is by opening the process. 
David Schoenbrod tells of an example where scientists and physicians 
ripped to shreds the EPA's report on lead pollution that suggested levels of lead 
pollution were safe.169 The report did not comport with scientific fact.   Open 
review creates a way to address whether something is technologically feasible as 
a matter of scientific fact (which may be a different question from whether it is 
economically prudent).170 It lets the patent examiner know if there is, in fact, a 
similar invention already invented or if his assessment of whether a particular 
substitution of compound X for compound Y is really not obvious. 
But open review not only makes more science available, it can reveal 
debates over that science. “Good science is a chorus of independent expert voices 
that come together with sufficient coherence and force to constrain policy, 
structure debate, and influence policy. Rarely does good science dictate a unique 
 
168 E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science’s Voice at the EPA, 66 L. & Contemp. Probs. 45, 
58-59 (2003). 
169 DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON 32 (2005). 
170 DAVID SCHOENBROD, SAVING OUR ENVIRONMENT FROM WASHINGTON 40 (2005). 
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policy outcome; more often, it structures a policy dialogue among different 
disciplines and constituencies by defining a problem and a range of options, but 
it may also figure in the decision of which options to adopt.”171 A more open and 
deliberative dialogue about science eliminates the concerns to which closed peer 
review is prone, namely the fear that there may not be scientific consensus 
around an issue.  When we discuss whether an innovation is truly novel and 
non-obvious, there may be disagreement.  Airing that disagreement is helpful to 
the process and informs how the examiner should proceed – how much time to 
invest and the course to adopt – in doing his work.  
This is also way to challenge bad science much earlier in the process 
without having to wait for litigation.172 Reform proposals abound173 to change 
the standard of judicial review for granted patents as well as for agency 
determinations based on science.174 Scholars and practitioners have recognized 
 
171 E. Donald Elliott, Strengthening Science’s Voice at the EPA, 66 L. & Contemp. Probs. 45, 
46 (2003). 
172 See, e.g. Joseph Farrell and Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge and Defend Patents: 
Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and Why Administrative Patent Review 
Might Help, 19 BERK. TECH. L. J. (2004). 
173 See, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Douglas Lichtman and Bhaven Sampat, What to Do about Bad 
Patents?, 28 REGULATION 10-13 (2005-6) (proposing 1) weakening the presumption of 
validity, 2) allowing legitimate inventors to earn a presumption of validity and "gold-
plating" their patents by paying for more thorough  searches, and 2) instituting post-
grant opposition, "a process by which parties other than the applicant would have the 
opportunity to request and fund a thorough examination of a recently issued patent."). 
174 For a discussion of a wide variety of reform proposals, see Matthew Sag and Kurt 
Rohde, A Differential Impact Analysis of Patent Reform (draft dated Aug 12, 2006) 
(analyzing patent reform proposals through differential impact analysis), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers2/sag.doc. See also Brendan 
Chase, IBM Calls for Patent Reform, ZDNET, AUSTRALIA, 11 April 2005, available at 
http://www.zdnet.com.au/news/0,39023165,39187609,00.htm.  
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the problems that arise with Chevron-deference to agency decision making.175
While this does not substitute for such reforms, open review does provide an 
additional check – and one more expert than the courts – of the work of agencies. 
Open review has another benefit that goes beyond the immediate process 
of patent examination.  It promotes deliberation around issues of national 
importance. “Such deliberation can lead individuals to revise opinions (about 
both facts and values), alter premises, and discover common interests.  
Disagreements and inconsistencies encourage individuals to balance and rank 
their wants. The discovery that solely personal concerns are shared empowers 
people to act upon them.  Thus, public deliberation helps transform individual 
valuations into social values; it helps forge collective purposes, and, even more 
important, helps define and refine public morality.  Through such deliberations, 
individuals become citizens.”176 Engaging the entire scientific community in legal 
decision making that is affected by science, promotes science education and 
literacy.177 On the one hand, this benefits science and advances its role in our 
society.  On the other hand, it puts scientific knowledge to work for larger public 
purposes by involving the public in peer review.  This democratizes the 
 
175 Chevron U. S. A. V. Natural Resources Defense Council, et al., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) ("We 
have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an executive 
department's construction of a statutory scheme it is entrusted to administer, and the 
principle of deference to administrative interpretations "has been consistently followed 
by this Court whenever decision as to the meaning or reach of a statute has involved 
reconciling conflicting policies, and a full understanding of the force of the statutory 
policy in the given situation has depended upon more than ordinary knowledge 
respecting the matters subjected to agency regulations.") 
176 Robert Reich, Public Administration and Public Deliberation: An Interpretive Essay, 94 
YALE L.J. 1617, 1631-2 (1985); also Beth Simone Noveck, Designing Deliberative Democracy 
in Cyberspace: The Role of the Cyber--Lawyer, 9 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1 (2003). 
177 PHILIP KITCHNER, SCIENCE, TRUTH AND DEMOCRACY 142 (2001). 
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conversation about science, promotes deliberation about issues of scientific 
understanding and advances the goals of democratic participation. 
This open process obviously increases oversight over the regulatory 
process by another institution in addition to Congress and the courts.  It allows 
the public not only to vet but to produce the information on which regulatory 
decisions are based.  In the case of patent examination, this is essential.  The 
centralized examiner does not have access to the requisite information or know-
how to make informed decisions.   Open review could be used, not only to help 
the federal bureaucrat do his work, but also to provide the mechanism by which 
to coordinate more regional processes of decision making and feedback and to 
spur a conversation across levels of government. 
Finally, open review is at once both more expert and more participatory 
than peer review.  It opens up the policymaking process to more members of the 
scientific community and provides the platform by which to organize and 
evaluate their input.  This suggests a way forward that balances expertise with 
accountability, science with democracy. 
Conclusion: Institutional Competence and Patent Reform 
 
Neither the Patent Reform Act of 2005 nor the Patents Depend on Quality 
Act of 2006 has passed.  While the Supreme Court heard several patent appeals 
this year, it changed its mind and overturned its own grant of certiorari in 
LabCorp v. Metabolite as improvidently granted.178 Had it moved forward, this 
 
178 584 U.S. ___ (2006). 
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case would have gone to the central question of the scope of patentable subject 
matter.179 Patent reform has been incremental at best with no major changes to 
the system since the Patent Act was enacted in 1952.  Open peer review presents 
an alternative avenue for legal reform by enhancing the institutional competence 
of the Patent Office.   It focuses on the institution that makes the decisions and 
employs the new communications practices that technology makes possible to 
improve its work.  Instead of seeking reform through the slower mechanism of 
judicial review,180 this proposal addresses its administrative law antecedents by 
revolutionizing the process of patent examination itself.181 
179 A number of scholars have called for urgent reform of the scope of patentable subject 
matter and have despaired of its failure to be enacted.  For examples of the most recent 
scholarship, see, Kevin Emerson Collins, Propertizing Thought (2006); Eileen Kane, The 
Dormancy and Revival of the Patentable Subject Matter Doctrine (2006); Sean M. O’Connor, 
Using Science & Technology Studies to Redefine Patentable Subject Matter under the Progress 
Clause of the Constitution (2006).  These unpublished papers are available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/schedule.html.
180 cf., Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1510 
(2001) (arguing that because most patents are not of tremendous value, reform should be 
ex post rather than ex ante) (“The strong implication of these numbers is that society 
ought to resign itself to the fact that bad patents will issue, and attempt to deal with the 
problem ex post, when the patent is asserted in litigation.  This result is admittedly 
counterintuitive.  It depends crucially on the fact that very few patents are ever the 
subject of litigation, or even licensing.  Because of this, money spent improving the PTO 
examination procedures will largely be wasted on examining the ninety-five percent of 
patents that will either never be used, or will be used in circumstances that don’t 
crucially rely on the determination of validity”). 
181 See, e.g., Matthew Sag and Kurt Rohde, A Differential Impact Analysis of Patent 
Reform, Section B.1, p. 11ff (draft dated Aug 12, 2006)  (focusing on examination related 
reforms and discussing both this reform proposal and other patent office initiatives such 
as limiting the applicant’s right to file continuations, streamlining examination by 
requiring applicants to designate representative claims, changing the rules relating to 
prior art search by applicants and their Information Disclosure Statements and offering 
an avenue for “accelerated review), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers2/sag.doc. The Patent Office 
has catalogued its proposed rule changes online at: Proposed Rule Changes to Focus the 
Patent Office in the 21st Century, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/presentation/focuspp.html (last 
visited Aug. 17, 2006). 
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This not only precipitates a rethinking of administrative reform, 
generally, it demonstrates that it is possible to improve decision making by 
enhancing the informational inputs into the process.  Even were we to change the 
legislative standards by which patent determinations are made, without 
adequate information to enable a decision about what is novel and non-obvious, 
reform is not possible.  Agencies depend on good information to do their work – 
whether it is determining patents or air quality – and they lack the institutional 
mechanisms and the institutional culture to benefit from outside expertise. 
Focusing on the Patent Office qua agency not only shifts the discourse of 
reform to administrative practices, it makes the case for empirical and data-
driven reform.182 The legal profession often prefers “anecdotes to tables”183 and, 
with notable exceptions, there is a lack of empirical scholarship to support 
legislative change.184 By designing and implementing a pilot to change 
 
182 David A. Hyman, An Outsider Perspective on Intellectual Property Discourse, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 276, 278 (F. Scott Kieff, ed.) 
(2003) (discussing evident lack of concern about the dearth of empirical evidence in legal 
scholarship); see also Jack Goldsmith and Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Methodology and 
legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (2002); Richard Revesz, A Defense of Empirical Legal 
Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 169 (2002). 
183 David A. Hyman, An Outsider Perspective on Intellectual Property Discourse, in 
PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTIES OF THE HUMAN GENOME PROJECT 279 (F. Scott Kieff, ed.) 
(2003). 
184 For some of this recent empirical legal scholarship about intellectual property, see 
Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the U.S. Copyright Fair Use Cases (2006), available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers2/Beebe.pdf; William T. 
Gallagher, Strategic Intellectual Property Litigation: An Empirical Study of Enforcement of 
Intellectual Property Claims, available at 
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers/Gallagher.doc; Paul Heald, 
Copyright Ownership and Efficient Exploitation: An Empirical Study of American Works,
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/institutes/bclt/ipsc/papers/Heald.doc; Gregory 
Mandel, Patently Non-Obvious, Patently Non-Obvious: How the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent 
Decisions Irrational (2006); Lee Petherbridge and R. Polk Wagner, The Federal Circuit and 
Patentability: An Empirical Assessment fo the Law of Obviousness (2006), 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/polk/petherbridge_obviousness.pdf. See also Mark A. 
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workplace procedures, we can test the impact on the patent system.  We can 
ascertain if such measures promote the progress of the useful arts.  Rather than 
content ourselves with guesswork as to what legal reforms will address the 
patent crisis – wondering whether changing the standard of judicial review or 
reforming the obviousness standard will, in fact, improve patent quality -- open 
patent review will allow us to demonstrate reform in practice by means of 
defined metrics.  We can inject more information into the process to inform 
examination and test the results.  We can then lobby Congress for more 
thoroughgoing legislative change on the basis of concrete data as to what works 
and what does not work.  Gathering data through empirical research shows how 
we might conduct public participation and develop new models and new 
technologies to solicit public, more specifically expert, input to improve 
regulatory decision making. 
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